INTRODUCTION
The majority Supreme Court judgment in *Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union* quotes with approval AV Dicey’s famous remark that the United Kingdom (UK) is ‘the most flexible polity in existence’. In finding that an Act of Parliament was required to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union and commence withdrawal from the European Union (EU), this aspect of the judgment could be read as another illustrative example of the UK’s constitution ability to adapt to new challenges. In this paper, I take issue with this reading of the UK Constitution, arguing instead that parliamentary sovereignty’s assimilation of constituent power—the ultimate power in a legal order to create and posit a constitution—has stultified the development of British constitutional law. The result is a deeply ideological, as distinct from oft-hailed pragmatic, constitutional structure that is incapable of confronting the systemic challenges the UK faces. Consequently, I contend that by conceptualising a more antagonistic relation between the Crown in Parliament and ‘the People’ through questioning the democratic basis of the former’s claim to the constituent power, the UK constitutional order can be re-invigorated, parliamentary hubris tempered, and many of the constitutional challenges addressed. In turn, this re-appraisal requires the interrogation of the notion of the People in the UK constitutional order itself.

Part I of this paper analyses the current UK constitutional ‘torpor’, arguing that despite what appear to be a number of substantial constitutional reforms in recent decades, the persistent inviolability of parliamentary sovereignty is inhibiting deeper constitutional restructuring. The result is a constitutional law in ‘crisis’ and potentially at the precipice of a paradigmatic revolution. Part II then introduces the concept of constituent power and questions the assumption made by much of the literature that constituent power is exclusively vested in the People. A descriptive as distinct from normative account of constituent power is instead advanced in order to provide a more critical lens through which constitutional orders can be assessed. This, in turn, paves the way for a distinction to be drawn between the possessor of constituent power in a constitutional order and the People. Part III then analyses constituent power in the context of the UK, arguing that the idea of parliamentary sovereignty shares many features with constituent power. However, this does not mean that constituent power is vested in the British People; rather, the locus of constituent power

---

2 Alison Young thus suggests that ‘history may merely regard it [Brexit] as a blip in the ever-evolving nature of the UK’s famously flexible uncodified constitution. See Alison Young, ‘Will Brexit change the UK Constitution?’ *Hansard Society* (7 August 2018) [https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/will-brexit-change-the-uk-constitution](https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/will-brexit-change-the-uk-constitution) accessed 23 August 2018.
in the UK should be more forcefully critiqued from a democratic perspective and its monarchical or oligarchical bases exposed. By acknowledging this distinction between the People and the locus of constituent power in the UK, the sacrosanctity of parliamentary sovereignty can be broached, and more effective constitutional reform can follow by embracing this tension between parliament and the People.

1. **The UK’s Constitutional Torpor**

   Amidst the throes of great instability would not ostensibly be the best time to claim that the UK is in a state of constitutional torpor. This claim makes sense, however, if constitutional tumult is symptomatic of this accidie. Neil Walker, writing in 2014 referred to the contemporary constitutional phase of the UK as ‘our constitutional unsettlement.’ Walker was primarily focused on the impact of devolution, with the impending 2014 referendum on Scottish independence featuring prominently. Walker attributes much of this unsettlement to the constitutional reforms enacted by the New Labour government which came to power in 1997 and ushered in the era of devolution. The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the concurrent growth in judicial power, and the continuing expanding influence of the European Union (EU) on the constitutional landscape also combined to ‘make the constitution more multipolar in its sources of authority and less institutionally concentrated.’ Analyses of these various changes during this period were often framed as the UK transitioning from a political to a legal constitution, leading to a renewed focus on this apparent growth of judicial power. None of these aforementioned changes— either individually or combined— have, however, mounted an insurmountable challenge to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in orthodox constitutional theory. This is not to say that parliamentary sovereignty has not been tested; rather, it is the case that the challenges mounted to date have not prompted sufficient re-appraisal of this principle. Indeed, these changes have resulted in more nuanced defences of parliamentary sovereignty, often based on identifying the republican credentials or other normative values embodied by the British constitution. This may, of course, be interpreted as corroborating the robustness and flexibility of parliamentary sovereignty and the British constitution; however, as stated previously, the opposite case shall be made here.

---

4 ibid 535
5 ibid 536.
7 See, for example, The Judicial Power Project whose stated aims are ‘to understand and correct the undue rise in judicial power by restating, for modern times and in relation to modern problems, the nature and limits of the judicial power within our tradition and the related scope of sound legislative and executive authority.’ ‘About the Judicial Power Project’ The Judicial Power Project <http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/about/> accessed 14 August 2018.
Parliamentary sovereignty: The Inviolable Constitutional Norm

The simple claim that Parliament may legislate as it sees fit belies a number of complexities. To say that Parliament may make or unmake any law it wishes necessarily implies that one parliament cannot bind another future parliament. This raises the paradox of a constraint on Parliament’s law-making ability in order to ensure Parliament’s unlimited law-making ability. This ‘positive’ dimension of Parliament’s omnipotence also requires what Dicey terms a negative dimension: that no institution is capable of declaring an Act of Parliament unconstitutional. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty thus stands as the apex norm of the British constitutional order and shapes the functions, not only of Parliament, but of all other constitutional institutions also, as well as overseas territories and crown dependencies.

It is this relation between Parliament and the other branches of government that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is primarily oriented towards. This has been the case since the establishment of the primacy of Parliament when sovereignty was wrested from the Crown, thus amounting to a claim of authority over the monarch. While the Monarch is still recognised in the statement that ‘whatever the Queen-in-Parliament enacts as a statute is law,’ the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Act of Settlement 1701 make it clear that the superior constitutional authority is located in Westminster Palace rather than Buckingham Palace. Prerogative powers—residual powers of the Crown with no basis in statute—have also been tamed with legislation firmly established as a superior source of law. Dicey’s formulation of parliamentary sovereignty, however, was primarily concerned, not with the relation between Parliament and the Crown but between Parliament and the courts. Parliamentary sovereignty thus injunctions the courts against finding a parliamentary statute invalid on the basis that Parliament acted ultra vires its constitutional mandate.

Whether Dicey’s formulation of parliamentary sovereignty has survived since the early Twentieth Century is a matter of considerable debate. The aforementioned challenges to parliamentary sovereignty in the form of UK membership of the EU, devolution, and the perceived trend towards legal constitutionalism have resulted in the need to re-appraise parliamentary sovereignty. That stated, the challenge to Dicey’s formulation can be traced back further than this to the fraught question of Irish home rule and Dicey’s own vehement opposition to it. The blocking of the home rule legislation by the House of Lords resulted in a showdown between the upper

9 Dicey (n 1) 3-4.
10 ibid.
12 Bill of Rights 1689.
13 This institutionally-oriented aspect of parliamentary sovereignty is illustrated by TRS Allan’s claim that, ‘Parliament is sovereign because the judges acknowledge its legal and political supremacy’. TRS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Clarendon Press 1993) 10.
14 Dicey (n 9).
15 See AV Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule (Richmond Publishing 1973).
house and the Commons in a situation where the Irish Nationalists held the balance of power. The result was an alteration in how Parliament could enact legislation through the diminution of the power of the House of Lords.\footnote{Parliament Act 1911 and subsequently, the Parliament Act 1949.} This change in the process by which Parliament could legislate clearly limited or affected future parliaments; consequently, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty had to adapt to recognise the fact that one Parliament can limit or alter the processes (manner) through which Parliament exercises its unlimited law-making power; however, it cannot place limits on the substantive content (form) of such future laws.\footnote{See Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; Michael Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart Publishing, 2015) Ch2.}

**Devolution, parliamentary sovereignty and the People**

The ill-fated Irish home rule acts, and subsequent partitioning of Ireland and establishment of a Northern Ireland Parliament following the Irish War of Independence thus illustrates that devolution should not be conceptualised as a wholly recent phenomenon.\footnote{Governement of Ireland Act 1920.} Nevertheless, the period of devolution ushered in by New Labour at the end of the Twentieth Century has presented its own challenges to parliamentary sovereignty. While Parliament could always point to its superior democratic credentials vis-à-vis the Crown or the courts, the same cannot be said with regards to the devolved institutions, all of which have a direct democratic mandate from the People in their respective parts of the UK. The devolution statutes themselves also have enhanced democratic credentials beyond Parliament, with each devolved region ratifying the move to devolution through a referendum.\footnote{Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997; Northern Ireland Office, ‘The Belfast Agreement’ (10 April 1998) \url{https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement} accessed 7 September 2018.} In particular, the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly was not simply endorsed by the People of Northern Ireland in a referendum but also, concurrently, by a referendum and subsequent constitutional amendment in the Republic of Ireland.\footnote{The Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1998.} Devolution therefore reflects a heterogeneous or plurinational dimension to the UK polity, in contrast to parliamentary sovereignty which is expressive of a unitary British demos.\footnote{See Stephen Tierney, ‘Giving with one hand: Scottish devolution within a unitary state’ (2007) 5(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 730.}

This point is particularly pronounced in the context of Northern Ireland where the question of whether there is or ever was a unitary British demos to begin with is inherently problematic.\footnote{To reflect this, the Good Friday Agreement allows citizens of Northern Ireland to choose their citizenship. They may be Irish, or British or both. ‘The Belfast Agreement’ (n 19) 4 [vi]; Sylvia de Mars, Colin Murray, Aoife O’ Donoghue and Ben Warwick, Bordering Two Unions: Northern Ireland and Brexit (Policy Press, 2018) Ch 4.}

Despite this recognition of a heterogenous demos, devolution, nevertheless, maintains the UK as a unitary as distinct from federalist state. Parliamentary sovereignty has been maintained through what has been termed a ‘triple lock’.\footnote{Rodney Brazier, ‘The Constitution of a United Kingdom’ (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 96, 102.} Firstly, devolved
institutions are empowered to amend or repeal primary legislation but only within
the jurisdiction in question and only within the ambit of the powers conferred upon
them. Consequently, the devolved institutions have express limitations on their law-
-making power and cannot act ultra vires. Courts are therefore empowered, for
example, to invalidate legislation passed by Holyrood. Secondly, the devolution
statutes are highly technical in their wording, shorn of lofty constitutional rhetoric.
In this manner, the statutes sought to empower more regionally based decision-
making without undermining the unitary basis of the UK. Only with regards to
Northern Ireland is the prospect of future independence from the UK countenanced;
however, this was the case since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Thirdly, the
devolved powers can be traced back to the respective devolution statutes and so can
be conceptualised as an expression of, rather than antagonistic to, parliamentary
sovereignty. Westminster’s right to legislate in the area of devolved competences is
also preserved with devolution striving to avoid a strict separation of competences
between central and devolved institutions. On this point, faith is instead placed in
constitutional conventions or what Aileen McHarg has described as soft law in order
to regulate this relation between Westminster and the devolved institutions. The so-
called Sewel Convention thus provides that Westminster will not ordinarily legislate
in an area of devolved competence without the prior permission of the devolved
institutions. This reliance on soft law has resulted in Mark Elliot distinguishing
between legal and constitutional restrictions on parliamentary sovereignty, arguing
that while devolution has not limited parliamentary sovereignty from a legal
perspective, it has clearly had an impact constitutionally and has managed to ‘conjure
into life a constitutional principle—devolved autonomy—whose fundamentality is
increasingly difficult to dispute’. Elliott’s analysis thus implicitly endorses the view
of the UK constitution as a flexible and pragmatic entity, capable of creating new
principles and conventions that respond to the demands of the age without the need
to resort to legal codifications and the limiting of parliamentary sovereignty.

The UK’s decision to leave the EU (Brexit), however, has demonstrated the fragility of
this ‘fundamental’ constitutional principle of devolved autonomy. In Miller, on the
question of devolution and whether the approval of the devolved institutions was
required before Article 50 could be triggered, the majority judgment delivered a
master-class in judicial restraint and constitutional conservatism. Although the
Sewel convention was placed on a statutory basis in 2016 following the rejected

24 s29 Scotland Act 1998.
25 Brazier (n23) 103; Masterman and Murray (n 11) 368.
26 Brazier ibid 100.
27 Ibid 102-103.
30 The Sewell Convention is named after Lord Sewel who first proposed the convention during a
31 Mark Elliott, ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Legal, Constitutional, and Political
Perspective’ in Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver, and Colm Ó Cinnéide, The Changing Constitution (8th ed
Scottish independence referendum, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that it legally constrained the sovereignty of Parliament, upholding the orthodox constitutional position that courts could recognise the existence of a convention but would not impose any legal obligation for such a convention to be followed. This reaffirmation of constitutional orthodoxy, however, rather than settling the question has only resulted in further agitation from the devolved institutions, most notably in Scotland and has only served to illustrate the challenges posed to parliamentary sovereignty by devolution.

All judges in Miller also reaffirmed orthodox constitutional theory regarding the legal status of the referendum itself. The European Union Referendum Act 2015—the statute that enabled and regulated the holding of the Brexit referendum—made no provisions regarding the outcome of the referendum and therefore it was advisory in nature and non-binding on Parliament. This finding was entirely unsurprising and, indeed, anything to the contrary would have amounted to no less than the uprooting of parliamentary sovereignty. However, to leave the question of the referendum and its impact on parliamentary sovereignty at that would present an over-simplistic analysis of the relation between Parliament and the People. Certainly, the referendum was not binding legally; however, the political legitimacy it conferred upon the case to leave the EU was of such a degree that compelled many ‘Remainer’ MPs who campaigned against the UK leaving the EU to, nevertheless, vote in favour of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, conferring the power to trigger Article 50 on the Prime Minister. The classic distinction therefore between ‘legally binding’ and ‘politically binding’ which is replete throughout British constitutional discourse can be deployed. This analysis is also over-simplistic, however; the legitimating potential of a referendum has also revealed a schism between a sovereign parliament and the people it claims to represent that requires deeper interrogation. Brexit, and the use of referendums generally, are further examples of the fragmentation of authority in the British constitutional order but in this instance, the authority that challenges parliamentary sovereignty is not the courts, a devolved legislature or an international organisation but the People themselves; or, at the very least, different and competing conceptualisations of the People. Indeed, the aforementioned orthodox constitutional approach of distinguishing between legal

32 S2 Scotland Act 2016.
33 Miller (n 1) [149]-[151].
34 Perhaps the most striking example of this at the time of writing was the walkout on 14 June 2018 by SNP MPs during the debate on the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. See Ann Perkins, ‘SNP Promises more guerrilla tactics over Brexit powers’ The Guardian (14 June 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/14/snp-promises-more-guerrilla-tactics-over-brexit-powers> accessed 7 September 2018; ‘Nicola Sturgeon says she is proud of SNP MPs’ Commons walkout’ BBC News (13 June 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-44474429> accessed 7 September 2018.
35 Miller (n 1) [119]-[125].
and political ramifications of a parliamentary decision arguably made the decision to hold a referendum on UK membership of the EU an easier pledge to make. Due to the lack of formal legal implications of such an advisory referendum, little, if any, thought was given to opening Pandora’s Box and the possibility of revealing a schism between Parliament and the People as construed by the European Union Referendum Act 2015. In turn, this reveals a tension at the heart of the claim that Parliament possesses constituent power but that it is ultimately held by the People— a claim that will be explored further below.\textsuperscript{37} This tension may be constructive or destructive but either way, constitutional theory in the UK must address it.

That the Brexit referendum result is an expression of ‘the will of the people’ is, however, also over-simplistic; referendums in the UK have revealed a further schism in the very idea of ‘the People’ itself. Again, a formalistic reading of the EU Referendum Act 2015 would legitimate the decision to hold a UK-wide referendum (and Gibraltar) with the sovereignty of Parliament re-affirmed. This could be further corroborated by the fact that the issue was debated by Parliament and a UK-wide referendum was approved on the grounds that relations with the EU were reserved to the UK level and therefore the decision should be one taken by the UK as a whole.\textsuperscript{38} The alternative of a ‘double-lock mechanism’ whereby a majority of voters overall and a majority of voters in each of the constituent parts of the UK was rejected.\textsuperscript{39} However, as noted, devolution is an express recognition of the heterogenous or plurinational composition of the UK demos and Brexit has exposed fissures between the various constituent parts of the UK. With both Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to remain in the EU, and England and Wales voting to leave, the two constituent parts of the UK where the question as to their continued participation in the UK is a live political issue, has made this issue more salient than ever.\textsuperscript{40} Northern Ireland and Scotland face the prospect of being taken out of the EU with the consent of the ‘British People’ as a whole but without the consent of the People of Scotland and Northern Ireland. For Northern Ireland, where identities are more contested than in other parts of the UK, the issue is particularly pressing. Again, the case of home rule echoes similar tensions with Dicey, who was notoriously anti-referendums, nevertheless advocating for a UK-
wide referendum on Irish home rule in order to defeat the measure.\textsuperscript{41} The result is that, like parliamentary sovereignty, the Brexit referendum conceptualised the UK as consisting of a unitary British demos and failed to give due consideration to its fragmented, plurinational aspects and the implications this has for both the legitimacy of the referendum result and of the Westminster parliament itself.

**Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Courts**

In addition to devolution, New Labour’s introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) made a powerful impact on a constitutional landscape that tended to eschew the judicial protection of human rights. The HRA, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in domestic law with the promise to ‘bring rights home’ thus increased the propensity of both domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights (EChr) to act as competing authorities to that of Parliament. The operation of the HRA has therefore, quite rightly, been intensely scrutinised, owing to the powerful statutory power it confers on courts to interpret legislation compatibly with the ECHR. At times, this power has been exercised in circumstances whereby the courts have prima facie gone against the express wishes of Parliament in a particular statute.\textsuperscript{42} Nevertheless, the HRA preserves the sovereignty of Parliament in section 4 which empowers the courts to declare legislation incompatible with convention rights; however, such a declaration does not affect the validity of the provision in question.\textsuperscript{43}

Concurrently, what has been termed common law constitutionalism has also provided a powerful means through which courts have constrained the effect of statutes through interpretation. It describes the propensity of courts to interpret statutes in conformity with fundamental principles espoused by the common law such as the rule of law.\textsuperscript{44} Similar to the interpretive obligation under the HRA, courts have creatively interpreted statutes in certain instances which ostensibly appear to be contra Parliament’s intention. Most notably, in Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission, the House of Lords interpreted a provision that prima facie sought to oust judicial review in such a way as to render it redundant and preserve its jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{45} More recently, in Evans v Attorney General, the Supreme Court interpreted the Attorney General’s statutory power to veto a finding of the Upper Tribunal—a judicial body—in such a manner that it is difficult to imagine a circumstance whereby such a power could ever be exercised.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{41} See Mads Qvortrup, ‘AV Dicey: The Referendum as the People’s Veto’ (1999) 20(3) History of Political Thought 531.


\textsuperscript{43} S4 HRA 1998.


\textsuperscript{45} [1969] 2 AC 147.

\textsuperscript{46} [2015] UKSC 21.
Courts have also stress-tested the sovereignty of Parliament through the development of what have been termed ‘constitutional statutes’. Constitutional statutes are an attempt to make sense of what is prima facie a flat constitutional landscape in an era where elevating the normative hierarchy of some statutes over others is required to circumvent the legal difficulties that would arise should standard principles of legal interpretation such as ‘lex posterior derogate priori’ prevail. Constitutional statutes therefore are not assumed to have been impliedly repealed by a subsequent statute that comes into conflict with them. The idea of constitutional statutes is entirely one of a court’s creation; however, it is one that is necessary as a result of the fragmentation of authority under the UK constitution. Membership of the EU, for example, has forced the courts to grapple with related questions regarding a conflict between British statutes and EU legislation. In R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (No. 2), the courts held that they would disapply a statute that came in conflict with a piece of EU legislation.\(^{48}\) Factortame was heralded as a paradigmatic shift in some quarters and a clear example of Parliament limiting a future parliament.\(^{49}\) Almost a quarter of a century later, however, the Supreme Court subsequently clarified in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport that despite EU law’s claim to primacy over domestic law, this claim was ultimately a function of the European Communities Act 1972. Due to this basis in the domestic law of the UK, the ostensible supremacy of EU legislation could potentially be tempered by other domestic constitutional principles of the UK, i.e. parliamentary sovereignty.\(^{50}\)

HS2 thus illustrates the fact that the courts still baulk at parliamentary sovereignty—a point that is repeatedly stressed throughout the wider case law and theoretical literature. Both the case law and constitutional theorists seeking to make sense of judgments like Anisminic, for example, strive to reconcile it with parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary intention.\(^{51}\) In Anisminic, the court rendered the ouster clause impotent while simultaneously intimating that an ouster clause would be followed if the words used in the statute were ‘something much more specific than the bald statement that a determination shall not be called in question in any court of law’.\(^{52}\) When a draft ouster clause was included in the Asylum and Immigration Bill 2003 that proposed to do exactly that, senior judges speaking extra-judicially warned that they could find it unconstitutional and the clause was ultimately dropped.\(^{53}\) Common law constitutionalism arguably reached its apotheosis in Jackson v Attorney General where the Lord Steyn intimated that it could in future deploy the nuclear option and find a statute unconstitutional, ‘[I]n exceptional circumstances involving

\(^{48}\) [1991] 1 AC 603.
\(^{50}\) [2014] UKSC 3
\(^{52}\) Anisminic (n 45) 170 (Reed L).
an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts’. Despite these developments, however, almost 50 years after Anisminic, in R(Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal the Court of Appeal held that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal was immune from judicial review. Parliament had successfully ousted its jurisdiction.

Towards a Paradigmatic shift?
Like Lord Steyn in Jackson, Elliott too envisages an extreme, unprecedented constitutional crisis that would have to erupt before courts would fundamentally challenge the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Certainly, ‘an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts’ would be a prime candidate and Elliott’s example is evocative of Bruce Ackerman’s description of a constitutional moment where politics shifts from the everyday, ordinary running of the state to a more contested, combative form of higher law-making where formerly entrenched constitutional norms are up for grabs. The idea of constitutional moments provides an excellent lens through which to view and predict fundamental constitutional change in the UK’s uncodified constitutional landscape. However, short of an extreme crisis, the analysis above would suggest that there is little likelihood that courts will be the ultimate catalyst for finally ending the sovereignty of Parliament and even if they were to do so, it is likely that they would be merely reacting to rather than precipitating this ultimate transition to legal constitutionalism. Moreover, the emphasis on legal constitutionalism implies that this would be the result of such a crisis. That legal constitutionalism may be the ultimate destination of the current constitutional tumult does not, however, mean that the courts will be the catalyst for this change.

Elliott’s ruminations were published in 2015, during that brief window between the Scottish referendum in 2014 and the Brexit referendum in June 2016. A strong case can be made that the latter referendum and subsequent constitutional turmoil that ensued correlates closely with Ackerman’s idea of a constitutional moment. For Ackerman, a constitutional moment entails four steps: (i) a branch of government claims a constitutional mandate from the people to effect constitutional change; (ii) a proposal is put forward to such an effect; (iii) the proposal faces resistance from another branch of government; and (iv) a critical election takes place in which the people express ‘broad and deep’ popular support for constitutional change with the opposing constitutional branch of government subsequently withdrawing its opposition.

Ackerman draws on Franklin D Roosevelt’s clash with the US Supreme Court over his New Deal programme as an illustrative example of a constitutional moment. Constitutional moments therefore entail a clash between different branches of government—in the aforementioned example between the democratic branches and
the courts. Consequently, the phenomena that trigger constitutional moments may be much more ‘banal’ than an emergency situation whereby the legislature suspends or ends the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. Yet this does not mean that the constitutional change effected is less profound as a result.60

In contrast to Ackerman’s example of Roosevelt’s New Deal, the majority judgment in Miller sets up no such confrontation but instead demonstrates the Supreme Court shying away from such a constitutional clash. Brexit therefore does not map on exactly to Ackerman’s description of a constitutional moment. Furthermore, the claim to a constitutional mandate from the People for Brexit as a result of the 2016 referendum is obfuscated by the outcome of the 2017 general election where no political party received an outright majority and thus ‘broad and deep’ popular support for the supposed constitutional change was not affirmed.61 What is central to this constitutional moment is, instead, the role of the People and the potential conflict between the People and Parliament, and between different conceptions of ‘the People’. Ackerman views the People in his constitutional moment as interceding to resolve the constitutional dispute through affirmation or rejection of the constitutional change in an election. In the case of Brexit, however, the People themselves are an active participant in the constitutional clash as they emerge as a counter-authority to that of Parliament. There is also a clash between the People and different understandings of who ‘we the People’ are; between a unitary versus a heterogenous demos. The emphasis on the judicial role in the changing constitution is understandable given that parliamentary sovereignty has been institutionally-orientated; however, in this constitutional moment, the courts have taken a backseat role, re-affirming the orthodox constitutional position of parliamentary sovereignty and ignoring—rightly or wrongly— the emergence of the People as a constitutional agent and therefore a further example of the fragmentation of authority under the UK Constitution. Consequently, accounts of constitutional crisis or change in the UK that focus wholly on the rise of legal constitutionalism and the role of the courts precipitating this may miss the challenge to parliamentary sovereignty being initiated by the People. Ironically, it is a challenge that Parliament has unleashed upon itself.

The result is a constitutional order struggling to accommodate several constitutional innovations—referendums, judicial protection of human rights or other constitutional norms, and quasi-federalism— seen in other jurisdictions while at the same time seeking to preserve the sacrosanctity of parliamentary sovereignty. A strong case can certainly be made that the UK constitutional order has, to date, managed to confront these innovations; however, this failure to unpack the role of referendums and their impact on parliamentary sovereignty, merely leaving the impact of referendums on

the UK constitutional order as ‘political, not legal’ only serves to leave more questions unanswered. The resultant constitutional torpor currently facing the UK, may be described as what Thomas Kuhn terms a ‘crisis’. Kuhn, referring to the history of science, argues that rather than being a steady accumulation of knowledge and progress, science is instead often tumultuous, prone to crises and revolutions. Crises occur when the dominant paradigm is incapable of explaining or accommodating new evidence. Very often the existing paradigm is modified and adapted but only to the extent that its core parameters remain inviolable. New theories may, of course, be proposed and these alternative paradigms may better explain the new data; however, their acceptance by the scientific community will not simply be down to their superior explanatory ability. The hegemonic forces of the status quo will often resist any new theory that undermines the dominant paradigm, in order to defend their subjective investment in the dominant paradigm. A change in the paradigm only occurs through the unparalleled explanatory force of the new paradigm eventually overcoming the hegemonic inertia in the system. Kuhn describes this process of a paradigm change, not as one of evolutionary development; rather, it is nothing short of a revolution. The current adoption and modification of the British constitutional order has thus preserved parliamentary sovereignty, but this current constitutional crisis may require a paradigm change. The idea of constituent power may provide an insight into the trajectory that this paradigm shift may—and should—take.

2. CONSTITUENT POWER

The idea of constituent power is often traced back to Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès who, in his revolutionary pamphlet What is the Third Estate?, described it as ‘the moment of a constitution’s founding and an expression of the essential relation between the people and the state.’ Constituent power, according to Sieyès determines the constitutional structure and creates the ‘constituted powers’ that derive their validity from the constitution. The constitution therefore is an expression of the constituent power. Amidst the tumult of the French Revolution and regicide of Louis VI, Sieyès sought a legitimating principle of public power that rejected the divine right of kings that underpinned the monarchy of the Ancien Régime. Sieyès turned instead to the people themselves vesting them as possessors of constituent power. Constituent power thus emerges from the rationalism of the enlightenment, filling the lacuna brought about by the rejection of God as a source of legitimate authority. Despite this,

---

63 ibid Ch 8.
64 ibid Ch 9.
constituent power, nevertheless, is often described as containing elements that are synonymous with a conception of sovereignty that Carl Schmitt described as ‘political theology’; namely, its emphasis on legitimate authority and commands issued by an omnipotent authority.\(^{68}\) On this point, other writers trace the origins of constituent power back further than Sieyès, with both Yaniv Roznai and Martin Loughlin finding its genesis in Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty.\(^{69}\) Roznai, for example, argues that constituent power can be traced back to Bodin’s distinction between sovereignty—the locus of authority—and government which is the instituted form through which sovereign rules.\(^{70}\)

Like Bodin’s distinction between sovereignty and government, by creating the constitutional institutions through which public power can be exercised, constituent power necessarily requires the positing of further powers that its exercise has created.\(^{71}\) These ‘constituted powers’ are the power of every day government; however, they raise a number of questions regarding the nature of constituent power and its relation to the constitutional order it has established. Firstly, is constituent power exhausted at the moment of the constitution’s creation or can it also be expressed subsequently? Secondly, if it can be expressed after the constitution’s inception, how and what are the implications of this on the established constitutional order? Thirdly, if constituent power can be exercised subsequently, how can it possibly create a stable constituted order if its destructive potential constantly haunts the order it established? Constituent power therefore is Janus-faced, with both constructive and destructive potential; it can be both tyrannical and tyrannicidal. This destructive and constructive capacity of constituent power is clearly evident from the circumstances of the French Revolution, during which Sieyès articulated his theory, and in the influence that John Locke’s writings on the rights of the people to overthrow a tyrannical government had on the American colonists and their Declaration of Independence.\(^{72}\)

**Exercising Constituent Power**

Due to its constructive and destructive potential, revolutions are unequivocal examples of when constituent power is exercised. The destructive potential of constituent power, however, may not necessarily be quarantined to revolutionary moments only and, consequently, constituent power has been described as having a ‘tense and ambivalent relation towards the constitutional order founded by the

---

\(^{68}\) Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* George Schwab tr (University of Chicago Press, 2005).


\(^{70}\) Roznai ibid.

\(^{71}\) Sieyès (n 65) 12; Rubinelli (n 67) 5.

constituent power, regardless of the normative value of this constitutional order.\textsuperscript{73} As a result of this tension, David Dyzenhaus argues against the notion of constituent power as a means of understanding the normative basis for constitutionalism.\textsuperscript{74} Eschewing constituent power, however, results in an inability to explain how a constitutional order is founded in the first instance. In contrast, to Dyzenhaus’ approach some theories of constituent power deploy its creative potential only to explain this moment of revolution and the founding of the constitutional order. In essence, constituent power is viewed as a moment that ‘gives meaning’ to the constitutional order.\textsuperscript{75} These theories then attempt to ‘close’ the constituent moment by banishing it from the constituted order. All state power is then conceptualised as being constituted power and therefore limited. The defensive nature of these closed models of constituent power is demonstrated by the phenomenon of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. Constituent power has a juristic function in a number of constitutional orders with courts deploying it to distinguish between the power to amend a constitution and the power to radically change or what the Indian Supreme Court has termed ‘abolishing the fundamental features’ of a constitution.\textsuperscript{76} The Indian approach endorses the distinction between constituent and constituted power, with a limited amendment power amounting to the latter.\textsuperscript{77} In so doing, the ‘fundamental features’ of the constitution are preserved. Closed models of constituent power therefore can be viewed as defensive-oriented, banishing the destructive potential of constituent power beyond the very constitutional order it established; at the same time, however, it may be argued that its creative potential is banished also.\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Open constituent power and the people}

Banishing the constituent power from the constituted order, however, raises a further paradox as to the nature of constituent power. The creative potential of constituent power arguably creates the People themselves through its exercise and the creation of the constituted order; however, this raises only raises the further question of the relation between constituent power and the People as one must exist prior to the other but each cannot exist without the other.\textsuperscript{79} Alternative perspectives on constituent power attempt to address this paradox by eschewing the idea of a ‘closed’ constituent power exhausted at the moment of a constitution’s creation and, in turn, also harness the creative potential of constituent power.\textsuperscript{80} These ‘open’ perspectives view constituent power, not as exhausted at the moment of a constitution’s inception, but

\textsuperscript{74} See  David Dyzenhaus, ‘Constitutionalism in an Old Key: Legality and Constituent Power’ (2012) 1(2) Global Constitutionalism 229.
\textsuperscript{75} Wall (n 66) 379.
\textsuperscript{76} Kesavananda v Kerala [1973] SC 1461
\textsuperscript{78} Wall (n 66) 391.
\textsuperscript{79} Hans Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press, 2007) 9, 12.
\textsuperscript{80} Wall (n 66).
acting as a catalyst and irritant for change in the constitutional order, constantly interacting and shaping the constituted powers. Open models of constituent power tend to be concerned less with the destructive potential of constituent power, instead stressing its creative and normative dimension and placing a distinct emphasis on the People by drawing a close link between constituent power and democracy. This normative account of constituent power reaches its apotheosis in Antonio Negri’s proclamation that ‘to speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy’. The tendency to conceptualise constituent power as almost a wholly normative theory is most clearly demonstrated in the field of global law, in particular, the work of those seeking to legitimate the EU and other international or pan-state institutions or sources of legal norms.

In this discussion of constituent power’s basis in ‘the People’, Carl Schmitt is often invoked as a surprise champion of democracy, heralded as aiming to ‘rescue the primacy of democracy over the rule of law’. For Schmitt’s decisionistic conception of constituent power, the state is the political unity of the people brought about by a decision taken by the Sovereign to distinguish friend from enemy. This decision creates the stability necessary for the state to be established; however, it continues to haunt the constitutional order it founds, lurking in the background and ready to re-assert itself when the stability that it initially created risks succumbing to entropy. At such a point that can only be determined by the Sovereign, the Sovereign will intervene in the constitutional order to restore stability. This power to intervene, however, is not one that can be constrained by law; it is beyond the law and necessarily prior to law and the establishment of the legal order. Schmitt thus argues that constituent power or sovereignty is revealed in a constitutional order in extreme emergency situations where the rule of law cannot prescribe what ought to happen or control state power. In such instances, the constituent power reveals itself and the sovereign, as the sole arbiter, takes what it perceives to be the necessary steps to restore order. For Schmitt, therefore, ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’.

Constituent power, as a result, cannot be banished wholly from a constitutional order and liberal or legal constitutionalists who attempt to do so are doomed to fail. For Schmitt, the liberal perspective that the state is the legal order is utterly wrong; rather, the state exists prior to the legal order and consequently, the idea of constituent power cannot be banished by the constituted order.

82 See, for example, Geneviève Nootens, ‘Constituent power and people-as-the-governed: About the “invisible” people of political and legal theory’ (2015) 4(2) Global Constitutionalism 137; Markus Patberg, ‘Challenging the masters of the treaties: Emerging narratives of constituent power in the European Union’ (2018) 7(2) Global Constitutionalism 263.
84 Schmitt ibid 1.
85 ibid
Through his claim that the state is the political unity of the people, one can contend that Schmitt considers the constituent power to be vested in the people and his reputation as a champion of democracy vindicated. However, Schmitt’s claim that the people may hold constituent power was a reaction — and concession — to the relative success of democracy at the time as distinct from an endorsement of it. Schmitt certainly never argued that only the people can be sovereign as he did not contend that the people could be the sole possessors of constituent power. Rather, constituent power could also be held by a monarch and, indeed, this was Schmitt’s personal preference. Renato Cristi argues that Schmitt adopted the term ‘constituent power’ in *Constitutional Theory* in order to recognise the power of the People. His preceding work, however, used the term ‘sovereignty’, reflecting Schmitt’s preference for the monarchical principle. Schmitt’s use of sovereignty, moreover, lacked the creative dimension of constituent power; instead sovereignty — particularly in Schmitt’s earlier writings — is more synonymous with the power to issue military commands or *imperium* as seen in the Roman Republic and Empire. Constituent power, however, due to this creative dimension cannot simply be conceptualised as a command; nevertheless, many of the same elements of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty are present in his theory of ‘constituent power’.

Furthermore, Schmitt always insisted that his theory of sovereignty was descriptive rather that prescriptive. This, coupled with Schmitt’s personal preference for vesting constituent power in a monarch suggests that Schmitt’s theory of constituent power vested in the People should also be seen as descriptive rather than normative and certainly not motivated to ‘rescue the primacy of democracy over the rule of law’. Schmitt’s theory of constituent power is therefore as equally legitimating of monarchical power as it is of democracy. Cristi further argues that Schmitt only affirmed the democratic potential of constituent power because he had found a way to neutralise it through the rule of law; in particular, through the idea of representative democracy. Indeed, the very idea of constituent power as a means to moderate Rousseau’s conception of popular sovereignty is inherent in Sieyès’ use of the term. Thus, Cristi argues that ‘Schmitt could escape the grip of democracy’s logical consistency because he himself was not a sincere and honest democrat’. Throughout Schmitt’s work, there is a clear authoritarian bent with fear of the People latent. This should come as no surprise in light of Schmitt’s willing embrace of National Socialism, a point that seems conspicuously absent from numerous ruminations on Schmitt and constituent power. In turn, this raises further questions as to both the creative and

89 ibid
90 Thus the ‘Sovereign Dictatorship’ of Schmitt’s *Political Theology* evolves from his earlier analysis of ‘commissarial dictatorship.’ See Carl Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, trans Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Polity Press, 2014); Greene (n 60) 74-75.
91 Kalyvas (n 73) 226-227.
93 Rubinelli (n67) 3.
94 Cristi (n 88) 361.
destructive aspects of Schmitt’s conception of constituent power and constituent power more generally.

3. **The Locus of Constituent Power in the UK**

As the archetypal example of constituent power being exercised is at the establishment of a new constitutional order, it should be of no surprise that the UK, lacking a clear-cut revolutionary moment has eschewed constituent power. Indeed, the best candidate for such a revolutionary moment—the civil war and execution of King Charles I in 1649—resulted in the dictatorial Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell and subsequently, the constitutional ‘fudge’ of the so-called Glorious Revolution and restoration of the monarchy, albeit with greatly reduced powers.\(^95\) Arguably, there was a lack of intellectual and revolutionary philosophies to back up the revolution in the first instance and effect a new and truly innovative constitutional order; however, Martin Loughlin does attempt to trace the genesis of constituent power thought and democracy to the Levellers.\(^96\) The weakness in this argument, as acknowledged by Loughlin, however, is that the Levellers lost.\(^97\) Up until relatively recently therefore, it appeared that constituent power did not feature prominently in British constitutional discourse. Writing in 2007, Loughlin for example argues that constituent power serves no juristic function in the UK having been ‘entirely absorbed into the doctrine of the absolute authority of the Crown-in-Parliament to speak for the British nation’.\(^98\) An equivalence between parliamentary sovereignty and constituent power was also drawn by Alexis de Tocquvielle in *Democracy in America*, describing the Westminster parliament as ‘at once a legislative and constituent assembly’.\(^99\) Similarly, Joel Colón-Ríos contends that constituent power was not needed in a constitutional order where Parliament can create any norm it wishes.\(^100\) Colón-Ríos’ subsequent work, however, argues that the idea of constituent power was utilised in the British constitutional order prior to Dicey’s dominance.\(^101\) In particular, constituent power played an important role in empire and understanding the administration of the UK’s overseas colonies. For instance, the Imperial Parliament was often considered to possess constituent power to found the overseas colonies of the British crown.\(^102\) In total, Colón-Ríos identifies five separate conceptions of constituent power that can be seen throughout British history: constituent power as parliamentary sovereignty; the Crown and Parliament and sources of constituent power; constituent power as the

---


\(^96\) Ibid 35-38.

\(^97\) Ibid.

\(^98\) Ibid 28.

\(^99\) Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (first published 1835, New American Library, 1956) 74; Colon-Ríos (n 100) 308.

\(^100\) Joel Colón-Ríos, *Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Concept of Constituent Power* (Routledge, 2012) 89.


\(^102\) Ibid 317-318.
right of the people to instruct their elected representatives; constituent power as the right of resistance; and constituent power as popular sovereignty.\textsuperscript{103}

This conflation of parliamentary sovereignty with constituent power raises the question of whether constituent power in the UK can be described as vested in the People. Loughlin, for example, does acknowledge that constituent power can be vested in a monarch; however, he does so only briefly and gives the example of the Japanese emperor.\textsuperscript{104} At no point is the idea entertained that constituent power is possessed by the British monarch. That constituent power is possessed by the people instead appears to be axiomatic. Parliament becomes the locus for constituent power with its democratic credentials deployed to square the circle. Despite this, however, it still remains the case that it is one thing to say that Parliament possesses constituent power; it is quite another to say that this power is vested in the people. Thomas Poole acknowledges this, arguing that Parliament is not and cannot be the fundamental source of political authority; rather, Parliament possesses derived constituent power—a constraint power that acts according to the formal procedures and rules that were established by the constitution.\textsuperscript{105} Original constituent power, however, still ultimately vests in the People. Derived constituent power tempers the absolutist, unfettered dimension of constituent power and thus could be interpreted as a means of constraining Parliament’s potential to act as a ‘runaway assembly’. Poole argues that the Miller judgment paves the way for a ‘more bespoke constituent process’ whereby the People can be involved in substantial constitutional changes.\textsuperscript{106} Poole thus envisages a symbiotic relationship between Parliament and the People, mollifying any tension that may exist between the two. In addition, in much the same manner as Loughlin, he gives no further justificatory reason that constituent power ultimately resides in the People, again implying that it is axiomatic.

Poole attributes the notion of derived constituent power to Roznai who, in turn, draws a close link between derived constituent power and the concept of delegation—the entrusting of a competence or power in a constitutional organ by the People.\textsuperscript{107} Delegation also appears as one of the five concepts of constituent power identified by Colon-Ríos who argues that constituent power in the UK has been understood in certain instances as the right of constituents to instruct their Member of Parliament.\textsuperscript{108} The importance of ‘trust’ to derived and delegated concepts of constituent power underlies their ‘limited’ nature. Delegated constituent power, for example, has been deployed to explain the relation between the People and constituent assemblies in the United States with William Partlett contending that the limited nature of the constituent power exercised by a number of state-level constitutional assemblies in the US is explained by agency theory and the contention that the delegates to these

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{103} ibid 307-309.
\bibitem{105} Thomas Poole, ‘Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case’ (2017) 80 \textit{Modern Law Review} 685; Roznai (n 69) 116.
\bibitem{106} Poole ibid
\bibitem{107} Roznai (n 69) 110.
\bibitem{108} Colon-Ríos (n 101) 318-323.
\end{thebibliography}
conventions were acting as agents of the People.\textsuperscript{109} Aside from the oxymoronic implications of a ‘limited constituent power’, the difficulty with transplanting delegated or derived constituent power to explain the relation between the British Parliament and the People is that the idea that Members of Parliament (MPs) act as the agents of their constituents has been vehemently rejected. Rather, MPs, it is claimed, act as representatives with Edmund Burke famously stating that ‘your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.’\textsuperscript{110} This representative understanding has been recalled throughout the various Brexit debates in Parliament, notably by MPs opposed to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.\textsuperscript{111} If Parliament does exercise constituent power therefore and it is derived from the People, it is done so on the basis of representative—not popular—democracy, thus echoing Cristi’s analysis of Schmitt that his embrace of constituent power vested in the people is tempered by the fact that he found a way to neutralise it through representative democracy. Consequently, the link between the People and Parliament is much more tenuous than delegated or derived constituent power would prima facie suggest.

The idea of Parliament possessing a derived or limited constituent power is further complicated by the fact that there are no actual limits to Parliament’s law-making power with the sole exception of Parliament being unable to limit any future Parliament’s law-making power. As noted above, however, this limit is paradoxically necessary in order to preserve Parliament’s unlimited law-making potential. Roznai’s discussion of derived—or what he prefers to term secondary—constituent power is delineated in the context of a theory of unconstitutional constitutional amendments; i.e. to formulate a theory regarding a limited amendment power. Its transplantation to the UK therefore where Parliament can make or unmake any law it wishes is potentially problematic. Moreover, it is also difficult to see from either a theoretical or historical perspective exactly how Parliament possesses delegated or derived constituent power. The people never delegated power to Parliament; rather, Parliament wrested it from the Crown which had previously possessed it. Certainly, the same case can be made about many constitutional orders given the limited role of the people in constitutional drafting or constitutional affirmation and particularly so in the context of constitutions externally imposed;\textsuperscript{112} however, what is notable about the British example is that this seizing of the constituent power was made long before Parliament made any meaningful claim to be democratic or representative of the People. British constitutional history can instead be better understood as Parliament’s coup d’état and seizure of the constituent power being gradually democratically legitimised through the expansion of the electoral franchise. In much the same way as


\textsuperscript{110} Peter J Stanlis (ed), Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches (Transaction Publishers, 2009) 224.

\textsuperscript{111} See, for example, Kenneth Clarke, HC Deb 31 January 2017 Vol 620 Cols 829-830. Similarly, Dominic Grieve stated that ‘...the idea that the House in some way forgoes its responsibility to safeguard the electorate’s interests because a referendum has taken place is simply not a view to which I am prepared to subscribe’. HC Deb 7 February 2017 vol 621.

Hannah Arendt describes Sieyès as placing ‘the sovereignty of the nation in the place that a sovereign monarch had vacated’ so too did the English Parliament step in to the place left vacant by the execution of Charles I. Whether this Parliament, however, can be equated to the sovereignty of the nation—the people—is a different question.

In contrast to the US where delegated constituent power was deployed to prevent constitutional assemblies from acting as runaway assemblies, fears of Westminster acting as such do not feature prominently in UK constitutional discourse. In light of the emphasis of MPs’ role as representatives as distinct from agents of their constituents, such a lack of fear is perhaps indicative of the disempowered status of the People. The idea that parliamentary sovereignty can perform the functions of constituent power, the creative potential of the UK constitution, driven by Westminster is enormous; nevertheless, the Janus-faced nature of constituent power means that its destructive potential is enormous too and so has the potential to act as a tyrannical, runaway assembly. Nevertheless, Dicey flippantly dismissed any concerns regarding Parliament’s ability to pass a law that would put all blue-eyed babies to death, arguing that Parliament would be mad to do so and the British people would rebel in any event. Instead, Dicey advanced his theory of parliamentary sovereignty precisely because of his belief in the rule of law as the peak of English civilisation. It was unimaginable for Dicey that Parliament would violate the rule of law to such an extreme, notwithstanding a number of examples from Ireland and the colonies that should have undermined this faith.

The people or a monarch are not the only candidates for possession of the constituent power in a constitutional order. Schmitt further suggested that constituent power could be concentrated in the hands of an aristocratic minority or oligarchy, with Cristi arguing that Schmitt had in mind the powerful Italian city states of the Renaissance. In light of Parliament’s gradual democratisation, there is a strong case to be made that Parliament, for much of its existence, possessed (and perhaps continues to possess) constituent power on this aristocratic or oligarchical basis. Certainly, vast swathes of the citizens of the UK were excluded from the democratic franchise for centuries, with women not granted the same electoral rights as men until 1928.

In addition to sex, other limitations to the franchise included property ownership and religion. The clearest distortion of this gap between Parliament and the People was in Ireland where the largely Catholic majority was disenfranchised for most of its tumultuous 120 years as part of the UK. Ireland instead was ruled by a Protestant ascendancy and when 26 of the 32 counties of Ireland achieved independence, the idea of parliamentary sovereignty was abandoned by the fledging state, with strong constitutional controls.

114 Partlett (n 109).
117 Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928.
placed on the constituted legislature out of fear of it acting as a runaway assembly.\(^{118}\) Furthermore, embedded remnants of this old order remain in the British constitutional order. As noted above, the Crown still retains a role in legislating, albeit one rendered impotent through convention. Moreover, only one house of Parliament is actually democratically elected and, while representative democracy’s capacity to temper constituent power has already been noted, this is further amplified by the First Past the Post method of elections in the UK and its distortive effect on the composition of the House of Commons.\(^{119}\) The result of this conflation of parliamentary sovereignty with constituent power is surmised by Kalyvas:

> [P]arliamentary sovereignty finds in the constituent power its own impossibility. It is exposed as a usurpation of the constituent power by a constituted power which reduces popular sovereignty to parliamentary representation and to the powers of elected officials.\(^{120}\)

**Relational Constituent Power**

The most rigorous attempt to construct a theory of constituent power applicable to the UK is, without a doubt, the work of Martin Loughlin.\(^{121}\) Loughlin identifies three different theories of constituent power: normativism, which either deploys constituent power in the revolutionary moment but then banishes it from the legal order or rejects the notion of constituent power altogether; decisionism, which Loughlin attributes to Schmitt; and relationalism.\(^{122}\) Relational constituent power is Loughlin’s attempt to re-work Schmitt’s decisionism and accepts many of Schmitt’s foundations: for example, the necessity of relating a constitution’s normative aspects to conditions that actually exist.\(^{123}\) Moreover, it rejects the idea that the state is synonymous with the legal order, arguing that the political is a domain of indeterminacy that cannot be organised in accordance with some grandiose theory.\(^{124}\) As a constitution is political as well as legal, there will always be a gap between the normative and the factual and this gap must be filled through the practice of governing.\(^{125}\) Loughlin’s notion of relational constituent power, however, differs from decisionism in one crucial aspect. Whereas decisionism struggles with the paradox of

\(^{118}\) Indeed, such fears arguably came to fruition under the constitution of the Irish Free State and the infamous Article 2A of the Constitution, inserted by way of the ordinary legislative process and created military tribunals capable of trying any offence and pass any sentence up to and including death. The constitutionality of this was upheld in *The State (Ryan) v Lennon* [1935] IR 170.


\(^{120}\) ‘Kalyvas (n 73) 229.

\(^{121}\) Loughlin (n 69).

\(^{122}\) Ibid 227-231.

\(^{123}\) Ibid 227.

\(^{124}\) Ibid

\(^{125}\) Ibid
constitutionalism— the question of the people existing prior to the exercise of constituent power but also being constituted by the exercise of constituent power— relational constituent power seeks to overcome this by arguing that constitutional ordering is dynamic and never static. Relational constituent power instead establishes a dialectical relationship between the ‘the nation’ posited for the purpose of self-constitution and the constitutional form through which it can speak authoritatively.\textsuperscript{126} In so doing, relationalism seeks to harness the creative potential of constituent power by providing an account that is ‘able to enrich constitutional ordering’.\textsuperscript{127} In order to ensure this, Loughlin argues that:

If the democratic potential of this modern shift in the source of authority is to be retained, the political space must be recognised as incorporating an unresolved dialectic of determinacy and indeterminacy, of closure and openness. This is the basis of the relational approach.\textsuperscript{128}

‘The space of the political can be seen as a space of freedom (‘the absolute beginning’), but if it is to be maintained, institutionalization of rule is required.’\textsuperscript{129} Loughlin therefore envisages a ‘dynamic of constitutional development without end’.\textsuperscript{130} Loughlin further argues that constituent power is vested in the people but that does not mean that political authority is located in the people. Consequently, relational constituent power does not correlate with the assertion made by those who back popular sovereignty that the people possess political authority. Rather, according to Loughlin, relational constituent power identifies a ‘virtual’ equality of the people but in reality it ‘founds an actual association divided into rulers and ruled in a relation of domination’.\textsuperscript{131} Relational constituent power therefore seeks to establish a dialectic of ‘right’ between the rulers and the ruled such that it ‘seeks constantly to irritate the institutionalised form of constitutional authority’.\textsuperscript{132} In turn, Loughlin seeks a more constructive application of the paradoxical aspects of constituent power. For Loughlin, the constituent power is not only engaged (and exhausted) at the founding moment; instead it continues to operate and function within an established regime ‘as an expression of the open, provisional, and dynamic aspects of constitutional ordering’.\textsuperscript{133}

Relationalism contends that, ‘[C]onstituent power, produced by an intrinsic connection between the symbolic and the actual, signifies the dynamic aspect of constitutional discourse’.\textsuperscript{134} Loughlin, however, cautions against subsuming constituent power into the constituted order as the very tension that gives constituent

\textsuperscript{126} ibid 229.
\textsuperscript{127} ibid 231.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid 228.
\textsuperscript{129} ibid 229.
\textsuperscript{130} ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} ibid 233-234.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid 232
power its dynamic potential would be eliminated.\textsuperscript{135} There is always a gulf between theory and reality — between facticity and normativity. The former is an expression of sovereignty whereas the latter is an expression of sovereign authority and it is in the dialectic relation between the two that constituent power resides. Loughlin thus contends that:

\begin{quote}
...the constitution of a legal order by a political unity involves an exercise in positive law-making whereas the constitution of a political unity through a legal order refers not to the positing of a legal order (in a strict sense) but in the constitution of political unity through Droit Politique (political right).\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

Loughlin thus argues that constituent power could equally be termed ‘constituent right’. Ultimately, Loughlin must leave open the question as to where the locus of constituent power in the UK — and indeed any state — lies as he argues that:

\begin{quote}
[L]egitimacy must be claimed in the name of the people, and the question of who represents that people remains the indeterminate question of modern politics. The function of constituent power is to keep that question open, not least because ‘the people-as-on is the hallmark of totalitarianism’.\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

In this regard, relational constituent power seeks to maintain the creative dimension of decisionism while at the same time attempting to address some of the absolutist concerns raised by Schmitt’s conception of constituent power. Loughlin strives to preserve a space of freedom for the political and, ostensibly, one could contend that parliamentary sovereignty fulfils this function in the UK constitutional order. With no legal constraints on the content of legislation, Parliament is as free as possible to embody and preserve the political. Relational constituent power and its conceptualisation of a ‘dynamic of constitutional development without end’ has the potential to insert the People into a constitutional order that was founded without a clear-cut revolutionary moment and in so doing, legitimate gradual, incremental change. At the same time, however, relational constituent power evinces a degree of radical prowess by asserting its credentials of indeterminate scope and ends. In striving to strike this equilibrium between creativity and constraint, between rulers and ruled, Loughlin insists on the People being able to challenge those who claim to speak on their behalf. Relational constituent power is thus acutely aware of the destructive or tyrannical potential of constituent power but also its constructive and tyrannicidal potential too.

**The Creative Potential of Constituent Power and Parliamentary Sovereignty?**

Colón-Ríos argues that what all appeals to the concept of constituent power have in common is that they ‘typically involve some sort of challenge to the constitutional

\textsuperscript{135} ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid 229.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid 234.
status quo’. Relational constituent power, in contrast, when applied to the UK constitutional order, legitimates rather than challenges the status quo through supporting dynamic albeit slow, incremental constitutional change. Furthermore, in light of this incrementalism, it is difficult to see how, at least in the UK context, that constituent power is not collapsed into the constituted powers and, as a result, how the creative potential of constituent power is preserved. The result is the current constitutional torpor where the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is preserved at the expense of deeper and more fundamental reform of the UK constitutional settlement. Despite its ostensible radical potential therefore, the enfeebledment of constituent power is potentially inherent to relationalism. This creative weakness can be traced back to shared foundations between relational constituent power and Schmitt’s decisionism. As noted above, Schmitt embraced democracy but only because he found a way of taming the people: through representation and the rule of law. Loughlin acknowledges this, arguing that Schmitt saw the President rather than the parliament of the Weimar Republic as the possessor of constituent power due to his:

…concern about the radical implications of the rise of mass democracy and his analysis of the constituent power vested in the President served the purpose of safeguarding the authority of the social-democratic form of constitutional ordering under the Weimar Constitution.\(^{139}\)

This reading paints Schmitt’s vesting of constituent power in the President as an inherently defensive move, designed to temper the destructive potential of constituent power were it to be expressed through a mass democratic movement. Loughlin takes a similar step when he argues that although constituent power is vested in the people, this does not mean that political authority is vested in the people as maintained by adherents to popular sovereignty.\(^{140}\) It seeks to leave the question as to where the locus of constituent power in a constitutional order resides unresolved by allowing the People to challenge those who speak on their behalf.

This is not a fatal critique of the notion of relation constituent power; rather, by leaving open the question as to where the locus of constituent power lies and by insisting on the People having the capacity to challenge those who claim to speak on their behalf, relational constituent power must insist on critical appraisal of the means—constitutional or otherwise—that the People can issue their challenge. What is unclear, however, from Loughlin’s account is how the People actually muster this challenge in the UK; no concrete examples are given. It is in the space between normativity and facticity that this assessment as to the people’s claim to the constituent power can be stress-tested and where the irritative potential of the people should be evident. In this space, the true impact of referendums on the British constitutional order can be understood. In contrast to the US Constitution where the separation of powers creates flashpoints where constitutional authorities may clash

\(^{138}\) Colón-Ríos (n 100) 334.
\(^{139}\) Loughlin (n 69) 227.
\(^{140}\) Ibid 229.
and, in a constitutional moment, change is effected through the ‘will of the People’; the dominance of Parliament in the UK constitutional order obviates such points of contestation. Much like John Locke’s theory of the prerogative, the people are left with no other possibility but to revolt.\textsuperscript{141} On the other hand, referendums, far from being simply advisory, have the potential to act as an alternative authority to the legitimacy of parliamentary sovereignty, particularly if the question asked of the People is one that Parliament does not want answered in the affirmative as was the case with the Brexit referendum.\textsuperscript{142} This potential is further amplified by the People’s otherwise weak constitutional role as the pent-up irritative potential of a contesting claim to the constituent power is channelled through one outlet. While this point may prima facie legitimate referendums in the UK as a means to re-invigorate the constitutional order, a clearer delineation of this contestation of authority may equally provide ammunition for those wary of the use of referendums in the UK and should be borne in mind before the decision to hold a referendum in future is taken. It also has the potential to provide a strong justificatory basis for more robust or structured regulation of the referendum process itself. Regardless, the claim that referendums in the UK are simply advisory should be dismissed.

In this regard, attempts have been made to accommodate an understanding of referendums in the UK that goes beyond simply considering them to be advisory while at the same time preserving parliamentary sovereignty. Gavin Phillipson, for example, argues that a constitutional convention should be acknowledged where the result of a referendum will be followed by Parliament.\textsuperscript{143} Indeed, the wide gap between facticity and normativity in the UK constitutional order is particularly pronounced by the considerable amount of faith the UK places in constitutional conventions to constrain public power. Conventions are necessary in all constitutional orders; however, in the case of the UK they do more than their fair share of heavy-lifting.\textsuperscript{144} The binding nature of conventions has been described as a mixture of moral obligation and precedent with Dicey, for example, describing conventions as ‘the morality of the constitution’.\textsuperscript{145} Effectiveness is of fundamental importance to establishing the existence of and, by extension, the legitimacy a convention; however, without the moral or normative dimension, one cannot distinguish between a convention and what is simply a followed practice.\textsuperscript{146} Conventions, however, are distinct from legal rules and principles given this importance of efficacy to their existence and, by extension, legitimacy. Generally, a convention cannot place the same claim to validity as a legal rule, owing to its creation beyond the formal rules of a legal order. Conventions thus tend to evolve through practice rather than through a formalised, validated rule-creation procedure. The legitimacy of a convention therefore is more fundamentally dependent upon its efficacy than a formalised legal

\textsuperscript{141} Locke (n 72).
 \textsuperscript{142} See text at n 36.
 \textsuperscript{143} Gavin Phillipson, ‘Brexit, prerogative and the courts: Why did political constitutionalists support the government side in Miller?’ (2017)36(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 311, 322-325.
 \textsuperscript{145} Dicey (n 1) 417; McHarg (n 6) 859.
 \textsuperscript{146} McHarg (n 6) 857.
rule. That stated, McHarg argues that there have been attempts to create conventions in a declaratory manner in the UK.\textsuperscript{147} Adam Perry and Adam Tucker further argue that there exist ‘top-down constitutional conventions’ created through the use of normative rule-making powers as distinct from ‘bottom up conventions’ that emerge through the practices of constitutional actors.\textsuperscript{148}

Conventions in the UK constitutional order, however, not only give effect to the constitutional identity and aspirations of the UK, at times they are the primary defender of this identity. Convention stipulates, for example, that the monarch will not veto legislation, a power the Crown still, de jure, possesses. Such a power, if exercised, would radically alter the constitutional terrain of the UK and undermine its description as a constitutional democracy.\textsuperscript{149} This gap between the de jure constitution and the de facto constitution in the UK may, of course, be defended as symptomatic of its inherent flexibility and thus a testament to the irritative potential of constituent power. Moreover, the fact that conventions tend to be the product of politics rather than law adds an additional dimension of democratic legitimacy to them. Conventions, it may be argued, are the product of politics and thus simply manifestations of the will of the People and therefore conventions demonstrate that the People are firmly empowered in the UK constitutional order, notwithstanding their de jure status. On this reading, the UK constitution scores well on relational constituent power’s insistence that the people must be able to challenge those who claim to speak on their behalf.

However, as the legitimacy of conventions is dependent upon their efficacy, conventions may also be symptomatic of constitutional inertia. Jennings, for example states that:

\begin{quote}
Capacity for invention is limited, and when an institution works well in one way it is deemed unnecessary to change it to see if it would work equally well in another. Indeed, people begin to think that the practices ought to be followed. It was always done in the past, they say; why should it not be done so now?\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

The normative dimension of long established conventions therefore may be forgotten or not adequately interrogated; rather, a convention’s legitimacy may become wholly dependent upon its efficacy. Furthermore, the actual legitimacy of constitutional conventions has not been fully interrogated — a point that concerns Perry and Tucker given the prominent role conventions play in the British Constitution and that ‘self-regulation’ which is essentially what conventions are is viewed with scepticism in other areas of law.\textsuperscript{151} This becomes further pronounced in the context of ‘top-down

\textsuperscript{147} McHarg (n 6) 861-863.
\textsuperscript{149} Thus, Adam Tucker argues that the convention that the monarch exercise her power on the advice of her minister is fundamental to ensuring that ‘we live in a democracy rather than a dictatorship’. Adam Tucker, ‘Constitutional Writing and Constitutional Rights’ [2013] Public Law 345, 351.
\textsuperscript{150} Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (University of London Press, 1959) 80. McHarg (n 6) 857.
\textsuperscript{151} Perry and Tucker (n 148) 780.
conventions’. Moreover, a strong case can be made that if the gap between the de jure and de facto constitution is significant, it shrouds the constitution in clouds of ambiguity making it inaccessible to those without legal training or insider knowledge.\textsuperscript{153} While conventions in the British constitution have generally been benevolent—a point noted by Perry and Tucker as perhaps why their legitimacy has not been fully interrogated\textsuperscript{154}—conventions may, however, also mask where the true power of the state resides. A rather striking example of this is the manner in which Augustus making use of conventions and the trappings of the old legal order to hide the true autocratic nature of the Roman Principate to give the perception that the Republic still endured.\textsuperscript{155} These points may therefore fundamentally undermine the claim that the practices and conventions that underpin a constitution can be attributed to the People.

Adapting the British constitutional order to accommodate referendums through conventions raises the further problem of resolving a conflict between two competing conventions. Such is the case with the Brexit referendum as, should a new convention arise of Parliament implementing the result of a referendum, it would clash with the Sewel convention that Westminster will not ordinarily legislate in an area of devolved competence without the prior permission of the devolved institutions. One could contend that ‘ordinarily’ could be interpreted to exclude precisely such a scenario, with the referendum result taking primacy over the constitutional principle of devolved autonomy; however, this only raises the further question of why this should be the case. Again, the question of a heterogenous versus a plurinational British demos remains unanswered.

**Parliamentary sovereignty and constituent power: the most flexible polity in existence?**

Relationalism and open models of constituent power face the further paradox that the easier it is for constituent power to be exercised and break through to the constituted order, the less the need is for legal theory to resort to constituent power as an explanation; i.e. the risk is greater for open models that constituent power will be absorbed by the constituted powers. The result is that rather than make the constituted powers more radical, the opposite occurs, and the constituent power is pacified. By leaving as much power up for grabs as possible to politics, relational constituent power appears to possess radical potential; however, this conclusion can only be reached if one ignores all other power structures in the British constitutional order that suppress this radical-ness. In essence, without a critical analysis of how the People may challenge those who speak on their behalf, constituent power may be de-fanged. Rather than being the most flexible polity in existence, the UK is the opposite and monumental changes to the constitutional settlement brought about by devolution

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid 784-788.
\textsuperscript{154} Perry and Tucker (n 148) 780.
and the HRA have seen the preservation and entrenchment of parliamentary sovereignty. The idea of relational constituent power does not help us draw a distinction between ordinary law-making and higher or constitutional law-making. Rather, its utility lies in legitimating the status quo ex ante. As a result, far from being a radical idea, relational constituent power has the potential to operate in an inherently conservative manner.

Again, however, this is only the case if one fails to assess how the People may challenge those who speak on their behalf. Consequently, rather than seeking to legitimate the status quo ex-ante UK constitutional theory and practice could instead benefit from a more antagonistic understanding of the relation between Parliament and the people through a descriptive—as distinct from normative—appraisal as to the locus of constituent power in the UK. Such an understanding may help to an extent in taming the hubristic manner in which Westminster has exercised its sovereignty, particularly regarding the manner in which the decision to call referendums have been made. To date, Parliament’s claim to sovereignty has remained inviolable precisely because other constitutional organs were incapable of mounting either a serious political or legal challenge to its legitimacy. The relegation of a referendum in the UK constitutional order to advisory status requires the simultaneous reassertion of parliamentary sovereignty and a representative theory of politics. Like Schmitt, parliamentary sovereignty embraces democracy and the constituent power of the people but only because a way has been found to disarm it.156 This is evident, not just from the Brexit referendum but from others too, most notably the Belfast Agreement. Parliamentary sovereignty thus neuters what Stephen Tierney terms the ‘highly imaginative and constitutionally radical’ Good Friday Agreement.157

Parliamentary sovereignty neutralises the possibility of a constitutional conflict escalating to the degree whereby one needs to invoke a claim to constituent power to legitimise reform. The result is a stultifying and unimaginative constitutional jurisprudence where every square can be circled by reference back to parliamentary sovereignty. If relational constituent power is to unlock the flexibility and adaptability that is supposedly the hallmarks of British constitutional theory, a much more antagonistic relationship between the People and public institutions needs to be recognised. It is only through stressing the tension between the People and Parliament, acknowledging the monarchical and aristocratic legacies of British constituent power that true constitutional reform can be approached. This would necessarily entail a curtailment of parliamentary sovereignty, or, at the very least, a thorough comprehension of the institutionally-directed nature of parliamentary sovereignty and its weaker legitimacy vis-à-vis the People. This tension understood and confronted, a more stable constitutional settlement could be achieved. This does not mean, however, that it is up to courts to decide to invoke the concept of constituent power. Rather, it is not necessarily for the courts to utilise the doctrine of constituent power to face down parliament as this could do untold damage to the courts’

156 Cristi (n 89) 201.
legitimacy. It would be highly ironic that a plea to take heed of ‘the People’ in the British constitutional system would result in judicial supremacy, particularly in light of Dicey’s claim, as endorsed by the Divisional Court in Miller that ‘judges know nothing about any will of the People except in so far as that will is expressed by an Act of Parliament’.\footnote{[2016] EWHC 2768; Mark Elliott, ‘Brexit, sovereignty, and the contemporary British constitution: Four perspectives on Miller’ Public Law For Everyone (16 December 2016) <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/12/16/brexit-sovereignty-and-the-contemporary-british-constitution-four-perspectives/> accessed 11 September 2018.} However, it may take such a constitutional crisis for such change to take place. Notwithstanding this, however, the simple re-assertion of parliamentary sovereignty is such a case would only serve to highlight the dichotomy that exists between Parliament and the People stressing the monarchical or, at the very least, the oligarchical origins and continued basis of its claim to the constituent power. This does not necessarily mean a rise of judicial supremacy. The idea of constitutional dialogue between Parliament and the courts has already resolved many of the tensions between legislative supremacy and judicially enforceable human rights. Dialogue is also present in strong-form judicial review systems. The emergence of the People as a constitutional agent could therefore also be seen as the People as a participant in constitutional dialogue. It is in this dialogue where participants are placed on a more equal legal footing than currently is the case under parliamentary sovereignty that relational constituent power could reveal its true creative potential.

4. Conclusions
Legal norms possess both factual and normative dimensions. Gaps often emerge, however, between theory and practice—between facts and norms. In such instances, theory should adapt. Parliamentary sovereignty, however, has not. This is perhaps best illustrated by British responses to revolutions and the decline of empire. The retreat of the British empire should have prompted ruminations on the nature and limitations of parliamentary sovereignty. As Lord Denning observed regarding the independence accorded to British Dominions and overseas territories, ‘Freedom once given cannot be taken away. Legal theory must give way to practical politics’.\footnote{Blackburn v Attorney General [1971] WLR 1307,1040; Elliott (n 31) 43-4.} Giving way to practical politics is one thing; learning and adjusting theory in light of practical politics is quite a separate matter altogether. Lord Denning’s quote demonstrates that even in instances where Parliament has clearly limited itself as in the case of the independence of former colonies, dominions, and constituent parts of the UK, the contention that Parliament is sovereign prevails. Moreover, the invocation of constituent power to legitimate the administration of empire is far removed from the radical notion of constituent power by Sieyès. Such an understanding divorces constituent power from the people with the expression of—or rather the bestowing of—constituent power being not constitutive of the people.

With parliamentary sovereignty as the apex norm of the UK constitutional order, it follows that all British constitutional imagination and reform must not infringe upon this. The major constitutional reforms of the Human Rights Act, devolution and
British membership of the EU all had to be designed in such a manner so as not to distort this natural order. While a strong case can be made that the UK constitutional order has managed to effectively accommodate these changes, the recent impact of referendums has illustrated not so much a flexibility but a contortion in order to ensure the preservation of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty and the need to preserve it as the apex norm of the UK constitutional order has stultified British constitutional evolution or, at the very least, blinded constitutional actors to the potential illegitimacy of their actions. As an institutionally directed doctrine concerned primarily at establishing its supremacy in relation to first, the Crown, and subsequently, the courts, the relation between Parliament and the People has been neglected. So too has the composition of this people. If the UK constitution is to overcome the current torpor, it must confront the inviolable principle of parliamentary sovereignty. By recognising this tension between Parliament and the People, and between the competing conceptions of ‘the People’ a more lasting constitutional settlement unbridled by the traditions of the past could be achieved.

* Senior Lecturer, Birmingham Law School. a.greene@bham.ac.uk