

POLICING VICTORIA 2022

'a critical review.'

*THE
COMMUNITY
ADVOCACY
ALLIANCE
INC.*



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Acknowledgments

To those who helped put this document together and the professional manner in which everybody contributed. We hope we have given your input due justice.

The common thread that you all displayed was a commitment to improving Policing within Victoria for all Victorians and the Police who serve us. Thank you

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And the many others from the CAA and the broader police community. your views were important.

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POLICING VICTORIA 2022

INTRODUCTION

We acknowledge many police officers perform their duties in an exemplary manner, with skill and dedication and at times with great courage and bravery. On many occasions, operational police officers are well supported and lead. It is our intention to support all police officers and support staff to carry out their duties professionally, emphatically and effectively for the safety of all Victorians.

Vitaly important for every police members to have an understanding of the policing principles and their oath of office. It is also important for the community to know what is expected of police officers and to what they are held accountable to.

The guiding principles for this body of work are the Victoria Police 'Oath of office', the Police Act and the Peelian Principles.

They can be viewed at Appendix 3. Page 59

Chief Commissioner Shane Patton has said that he wants reform, but VicPol is such a big ship it is very difficult and slow to turn around.

The CAA is committed to assisting where possible by tapping our vast knowledge base.

This paper provides the touch points that we feel will achieve the objective sought if activated.

The CAA does not profess to have the answers to all the problems, but with over six hundred years of policing experience, we speak with some authority.

This is not intended as a negative critique but information that will allow the Chief Commissioner to target key issues with sufficient comment to achieve an outcome.

Many current problems have been allowed to evolve and not checked over considerable time. Taking the mantle of a norm rather than being appropriately analysed objectively and corrected before they become entrenched.

This has left VicPol with processes that have not kept pace with modern advancements in management, with systems dating back decades.

It is time for VicPol to modernise its management processes and shake off decades of ineptness while retaining what is sound

The CAA believes that if VicPol cannot or will not provide leadership in these matters, then an Inquiry led by a competent Police leader independent of VicPol, into Policing in Victoria is an option that the CAA may decide to advocate; something must change.

In the preparation of this document, we have been cognisant that there are fiscal headwinds on the horizon for the Police and other sectors of Government, so many of our initiatives are designed to improve the outcomes for the community without the necessity of substantially increasing the impost on the public purse.

This paper has been greatly influenced by the CAA members and others who share our concerns see *appendix 1*.

PART 1

SERVICE DELIVERY

- **Response times**
- **Customer Service**
- **Community engagement**
- **Communications**
- **Complaints**

The most critical function of any organisation is its ability to deliver the service for which it exists in a practical, timely and cost-effective manner.

A common failure of organisations is to assume that they know what the recipient of their service wants from their service or product without bothering to find out.

The information within the public domain of Service Delivery initiatives by VicPol gives cause for great concern.

Although unfortunate, confusion between Service Delivery and Service Efficiency appears to exist.

They are not mutually inclusive and are substantially different concepts.

Generally, the two must be operated independently with an understanding of their difference for either to be effective, and the Service Delivery component must assess and take precedent over each Service Efficiency proposal.

They can and often will work against each other.

Understanding your market

Failing to understand what the service recipients expect is another failing.

There needs to be empirical data on this point before Service Delivery can be measured. Unlike Service Efficiency, which can be measured easily, Service Delivery is as much about perceptions as reality, so unless regular and effective measuring tools are designed, the efforts to improve Service Delivery will inevitably fail.

Market feedback and management

The key to improving or maintaining a high level of Service Delivery is understanding the client base and achieving meaningful feedback to keep abreast of perceptions as they change geographically and culturally.

Of course, it takes a competent manager to decipher and untangle the two concepts that can often be diametrically opposed, but nothing will improve until that is done.

Central to good Service Delivery is the ability to measure effectiveness.

The best policing, however, produces no measurable result if measured by disorder. That there is no disorder, no crime and no traffic offences, policing may be highly effective, but there is nothing tangible to measure.

The absence of these elements may not be attributable to anything police are doing.

But the community may feel unsafe or anxious, so it is attitudinal elements that must be measured.

There are numerous anomalies and clear examples where Service Efficiency has taken priority over Service Delivery.

The first positive step is to separate the two concepts.

Measuring Feedback

The second major step is using available technology to facilitate feedback from all complainants on Service Delivery. Fully automated functions are widely used in the private sector.

Every contact where a person's details are recorded should automatically generate either by Text, Email or post a questionnaire to determine the level of service provided and client satisfaction.

The data processed at the Service Delivery unit must also be available to LACs and Station Commanders in real-time for the postcodes in their service area.

Accountabilities in Service Delivery

Command positions must have their KPIs linked to the Service Delivery feedback as a critical measure of their function.

Improved accountability as members adjust to having their function rated by the public will see a marked improvement in Service Delivery that will translate into improved performance of policing overall.

Feedback from complainants will quickly identify members with a negative unprofessional attitude, incompetent or lazy, which will allow Management to take remedial action.

The community has no idea who or where their local area command is or how to communicate with them. The public who are unable to gain satisfaction or who wish to escalate a complaint about policing have nowhere to go.

The organisation would greatly benefit if these matters came to the notice of local area commanders first-hand. Operating in a cocoon isolated from their community is counterproductive.

The benefit of the approach outlined will not create any greater impost on Operational Police time.

Although it only fulfils a portion of the Service Delivery Matrix, it is a crucial part.

Police non-attendance

One of the most frustrating experiences for any citizen is when they call the Police, but nobody attends.

Complainants waiting and watching for hours expecting the Police to arrive, and when they do not, without explanation, aggravates their problem. Any faith they have in Police is shattered, sometimes irreparably.

A burglary may not be a priority for Police but can be life-changing for the victim who has had the sanctity of their home violated. Police not attending when called is the height of ignorance aggravated by no feedback to the victims.

If you had an electrical problem and called and booked an electrician and they just did not arrive, what would be your opinion of the Electrician?

It is unbelievable that in this day and age, with technology at the beck and call of VicPol, instructional messages cannot be generated for victims providing an estimated time of arrival or if Police are unable to attend an apology and a short reason. (The same technology used for feedback) A Text to the complainant does not resolve the matter but can alleviate the feeling of being disrespected, as is currently the case.

Even if a unit is engaged in another pressing matter, it would be extremely rare for one of the crew not to have the opportunity to ring a complainant

waiting for them. A bit of multitask training may assist members who struggle with the concept.

This may also reduce phone traffic from complainants ringing to get an update on when their service will be delivered.

The difficulty of obtaining progress advice on your request for the Police is more frustrating than the non-attendance.

The problem is that Service Delivery for VicPol is approached from the wrong end. It needs to start with the users.

Part 2

COMMUNICATION

- **Barriers to communication**
- **Barriers to communicating with local Police**
- **PAL Line**
- **Local knowledge is key to Crime reports**
- **Realignment of PAL**
- **Crime report responsibility**

Communication is the cornerstone of good Policing. Policing relies on information, and the timely delivery of that information is critical to the success or otherwise of Policing. Therefore, forming part of the Service Delivery Matrix, good communications must not be underrated.

If the community cannot communicate with the Police, Service Delivery fails.

Communications are now not just the traditional telephone but other mediums, and policing in this State has failed to take advantage of the current opportunities.

Not only does technology have the capacity to respond automatically to every incoming communication with the opportunity for feedback, but it also provides a similar option for intra-communications, a valuable personnel management feedback tool.

There are many weaknesses in the current approach.

- a) **Barriers to communication**

The ability for persons outside VicPol to communicate with anybody within the organisation. Unless you know their phone number, it is next to impossible. A legacy of the use of Mobile phones rather than landlines.

b) Barriers to communicating with local Police

The community finds it extremely difficult to communicate with their local Police, and if the phone call is answered, a long menu of options confronts the caller. The caller invariably does not know who they should be talking to – the concept of '*sending the fool further*' springs to mind. It is not up to the caller to decide who they should talk to; that is a function of the organisation providing the service.

c) PAL Line

Police Advice Line 131444 is an example where Service Efficiency has trumped Service Delivery. Some CAA members were involved in the original PAL concept, and the idea has been lost in striving for supposed efficiency.

Rather than take reports by an operator, the call should be redirected to the local police station on a dedicated line for those old enough to remember, similar to the Bat Phone concept.

A major advantage of this approach is the Station can respond to the complainant and take ownership of the problem. A Watch House Keeper generally knows or should know what the vehicles operating from that Station are up to and current workloads.

d) Local knowledge is key to Crime reports

How an operator taking crime reports can glean helpful information from a complainant when they do not know the area referred to is a case in point. Many corporations that we all deal with regularly in our private lives are implementing change based on effectiveness instead of efficiency. The first casualty is the offshore call centres, and the second is operators who speak clear English.

e) Realignment of PAL

We do not advocate the closure of the PAL but a realignment enabling the public to communicate with their local Police

achieving the added advantage of local Police connecting better with their communities.

f) Crime report responsibility

If crime is to be reported, it MUST be to the Station responsible otherwise, the data is lost in the sea of information slopping around within the organisation. Intel and other data, an imperative for solving crime, can be easily missed in the information merry-go-round.

Reported crimes are funnelled to the Station responsible for investigation. This is double handling with time and perhaps intelligence lost in the process.

Without personal contact between the investigating member and the complainant, the enthusiasm and ownership of the crime are lost. That ownership of the crime by the Investigator and the relationship with the complainant develops passive accountability, which is also lost. If crime is reported to a Police Station is too time-consuming, then develop a Police auxiliary where highly skilled former operational members can take the reports at the Stations. The results may astound.

Part 3

COMPLAINTS

- **Police cultural flaw**
- **Empathy not statistics**

An area of some flawed rationales and perceptions that must be addressed.

Complaints are essential to improve Service Delivery, manage corruption and improve efficiency, effectiveness and are a critical management tool.

If you do not know what is wrong, then how do you fix it?

Praise does not improve performance, but complaints do and are invaluable to enlightened management.

Police cultural flaw

The major flaw in Police culture is that if anybody complains, they must be anti-police. Unfortunately, most Police, at some time in their career, have

fallen for this incorrect assumption, usually driven by aggravated complainants who are persistent and want action taken.

This flawed perception actively discourages complaints and allows flawed practices to flourish unchecked.

Police managers must be trained to handle these situations by supporting the Operational members when they have responded or acted appropriately.

Empathy not statistics

When complaints are aired publicly, the Police response often is to quote statistics, but statistics do not make a community safe. It is the lived experiences of the victim that counts.

Police must refrain from this practice, demonstrate empathy, and ensure a senior officer meets with the complainant. Not to justify police action but to reassure and work with the complainant to settle their anxiety and issue with practical advice.

Why a Senior Officer? Because the incident was of extreme importance to the victim, the least VicPol should do to respect the importance of the impact on the victim by showing VicPol cares. After all, if a victim feels unsafe, is that not a failure of Policing?

The recent case of Rebecca Judd, a high-profile influencer complaining about crime in her neighbourhood, is a case in point.

The Premier pilloried Mrs Judd, and the Police response highlighted statistics that, in effect, was telling all and sundry that Judd was wrong. Then, by inference, Judd imagined a problem that statistically didn't exist.

We have been advised by people in Judd's community that there is a special police effort with a switch to high visibility policing, which is reported to us as having a very positive effect on the community.

Just how much better the whole incident would have played out if the Premier had kept out of it (Separation of Powers) and Police had expressed some empathy with Judd and her community.

Additionally, playing this issue out in the media is a prerogative of the complainant, but the Officers involved in this matter should have vacated their comfortable office and knocked on Judd's door to have a chat instead of taking the statistics don't lie approach in the media.

On that issue, we do not blame the local Officer, but where and on what planet were the VicPol media advisers.

PART 4

STRATEGIC POLICING

- **Reactive, proactive and pre-emptive policing**
- **General Policing**
- **Road Policing**
- **Task Violence Force Policing**
- **Family/ Domestic**

Central to all policing is the visibility of the organisation to the public. The deterrent effect is as important as the eudaemony for the people. (Service Delivery). An invisible Police Force is ineffective. Like all goods and services, a visible profile is essential to keep the service front of mind.

Police patrols have seemed to have morphed into aimless wandering between tasks, and sometimes, they are too visible and vulnerable. The main safety equipment that a member carries is *Situational Awareness*; however, given what we see regularly, is it a skill sadly missing from the current members.

The lack of this skill which increases the danger to members, is either lacking in training or is a supervisory failure.

To improve overall police effectiveness, the following suggestions we believe have substantial merit.

- a) Every police officer, as part of their performance appraisal, demonstrates how they are involved in fulfilling their commitment in their oath of office of doing everything in their power to prevent offences.
- b) In order to be considered suitable for promotion at all levels:
 - Demonstrate how they are involved in fulfilling their commitment in their oath of office of doing every in their power to prevent offences.
 - Demonstrate how they support members under their command - people-centred leadership.

- c) Victoria Police to take the lead role in prevention and develop expertise in prevention of offences. Conduct research to develop Prevention and Citizen Empowered Policing. Victoria Police and government allocate resources to prevention and evaluation – partnerships formed with tertiary institutions to this end and involvement of the Victoria Crime Statistics Agency Research role, in line with Evidence-Based Policing. Supt Dave Cowan is currently on a Churchill Fellowship looking at this around the world.
- d) Urgently review the current region structures.
- e) Re-introduce de-escalation of conflict/violence training as part of OSST.
- f) Utilise and be involved in interdisciplinary teams. e.g. Aim to establish an Operation Newstart program in every municipality in Victoria, utilising a bottom-up rollout where communities demonstrate their readiness and need, which would include indicators such as the Australia Bureau of Statistics, Socio-Economic Index for areas and sustainability.
- g) Have the Crime Statistics Agency publish the Computer-Aided Dispatch Data regarding calls to 000 - it is data we pay to collect. Similarly, provide the data currently provided to the Premier's Department. Open and transparent governance.
- h) Improved I.T. to support people-centred policing to:
 - a. Enable electronic reporting, including uploading of multimedia,
 - b. Track progress of reports, and
 - c. Provide feedback to reporting members of the public
 - d. Enable improved surveying of community satisfaction – after every contact, there should be the ability to complete an electronic satisfaction survey. Utilise this data to identify members/units/stations who perform/do not perform.

Foot patrols

Whether it is a lack of training, lack of Supervision or both, it is hard to determine, but the whole approach to foot patrols must be reviewed if you can get members out of their vehicles.

Not only from an effectiveness consideration but very much for the safety of the members.

There appears to be a consistent and absolute disregard for '*Situational Awareness*', which is arguably the most important skill to ensure members' safety and effectiveness. '*Situational Awareness*' substantially trumps all the other hardware members carry and is the most effective weapon in the Police member's arsenal. For observations, see Appendix 2.

We have been concerned about the apparent lack of commitment to this problem by the Police Association and Police Management. It directly affects the safety of all members the moment they put their uniform on or approach their workplace, irrespective of their duty.

The risks vary across the organisation. However, the frontline police are the most susceptible, and no matter how many police may be in a given place, the risks do not necessarily diminish, but without training can escalate.

One member alone can be less of a target than a group of three or four. Apart from being a bigger target, inevitably, their situational awareness will be compromised by interactions.

We can create a future that is not simply a rehash of the recent past where policing resources committed to a reactive approach clearly outweigh resources committed to the prevention of offences.

To address this imbalance, input needs to come from the public, all levels of government, in particular local government, academia, policing and other agencies. Alternatively, we can risk fulfilling one of Albert Einstein's definitions; insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.

Highway Patrols

Highway Patrols have the dual function of managing road user compliance and the general safety of people using the Highways. It, therefore, seems incredulous that people can drive large distances over many hours throughout the State without seeing a police car.

A comment by a former Highway Patrol member who drove for many hours and the only Police car he saw was outside a Police station was indicative of the issue. These comments are not isolated and existed pre-covid, indicating a major problem in how the highways are policed.

- i. The area of failure must be a supervisory one, and it is clear that new technologies to coordinate police resources to

maintain a visible police presence over multiple Police Service areas have not been developed or applied.

- ii. Laziness may have crept into the role of supervisors, where rostering a car on is all that is required; the supervision and actual tasks performed during any given shift are left to the individual units working in isolation.
- iii. The "two-up" policy has had a devastating impact on the ability to maintain highway patrols. Supervision is negligible because a supervisor must draw a member from somewhere to accompany them, so they tend to remain off the road.
- iv. The two-up policy will be dealt with elsewhere. There should be no reason to prohibit members from working one up if they are competent and another car working one up works in tandem, multiplying the visible police presence by 100%.
- v. In another recent observation where an incident happened on a freeway and multiple police, eight members were mooching around a scene. It was clear that there was only one perpetrator/suspect with no apparent violence. It is unbelievable and disturbing that the gaggle of members were predominantly there for the show and not involved. Significantly none protected the members involved, set up vehicles for protection or took any similar action.
This is surprising behaviour given the recent history of the deaths of Police in a similar scenario.
Again, this incident has the hallmarks of failed Supervision. With so many members at a scene, a Sergeant should have attended and taken charge. A Sergeant could not see the situation from the Office. Perhaps the two-up policy creates an unintended consequence, a falloff in operational Supervision.

Part 5

RANK STRUCTURE

- Historical impact
- Considerations
- Station officer
- Considerations
- Officer rotations

Based on the then efficiency, ranks, particularly of Officers, were removed over thirty years ago.

This accompanied a reorganisation of the Force management structure geographically as well as functionality.

This new system worked well until the early 2000s, when it would seem executive incompetence destroyed it. The explosion of the centralising of Power was the cause.

Unfortunately, a string of Chief Commissioner either lacked the ability or the will to address what was a ballooning problem centralising far too much of the decision-making at the top, diluting the capacity of lower managers to make decisions of even some basic functions.

There was no greater demonstration of the failure of the management processes of VicPol than was aired during the Royal Commission into Police Informants.

The Chief Commissioner of that time took no action passing it to the current Commissioner to sort out, along with a raft of other issues.

The net effect has not been any greater efficiency but a breakdown of good Governance by,

- a) Reducing career opportunities creates frustration causing less than optimum performance in many officers.
- b) Creating inefficient spans of control.
- c) Providing fertile ground for nepotism, one of Officer Ranks' main contributors to dissatisfaction.
- d) Ensures competent officers are overlooked.
- e) Progression and promotion are not an evolutionary process with significant gaps in rank and responsibility leaving the opportunity for

less than competent people to be promoted without demonstrating their ability to perform at a higher level than whence they came. And the obverse that competent managers cannot adequately demonstrate their capacity for higher rank.

- f) Officer training is also a weakness. While we accept the benefit and encourage Police to undertake Tertiary Studies, we have lost sight of the discipline that the Officers are applied to, which is policing.

Therefore, there needs to be a greater emphasis on training to produce more highly qualified police Leaders. Police leadership does not automatically evolve with training in other disciplines, so the responsibility falls to VicPol.

Considerations

To revisit the deleted Ranks to help improve the devolution of decision-making closer to where the impact is most impacted.

Station officer

Again, occurring through evolution in isolation without consideration of consequences and possible benefits, the role of the Senior Sergeant in charge of a Police Station has been diluted culturally. In some cases, operationally.

Additional Senior Sergeants have been allocated to many Police Stations to share the onerous workload of running a large Station. Although the In Charge Senior Sergeant is remunerated for the additional in charge accountability, their rank does not adequately represent their responsibility.

- a) This is particularly important in public perceptions and the public's respect and confidence to react to the higher rank.
- b) Station Commanders in charge achieve their rank without substantial personnel management training, which is clearly an anomaly given the large numbers of staff under their span of control and their responsibilities to those staff.
- c) Thankfully and to the credit of all Senior Sergeants, there is little evidence of dysfunction of people of equal rank given identical responsibilities and left to the will of the members involved in channelling effort to achieve a better Policing outcome. However, the perception, particularly to the public, is important and identifying the person in charge by rank is both sensible and appropriate.
- d) Police members aspiring to become Station Commanders having served at the rank of Senior Sergeant would be encouraged to attend

a Station Officer training course to qualify, improving personnel management throughout VicPol.

- e) From a staff management perspective, staffing issues elevated from sub-officers to Senior Sergeant level would then have the ability to elevate the matter to Station Commander, giving more weight and adding tools to manage staff.

Considerations

- a) The cost of promoting all Senior Sergeants In charge of a Police Station with more than one Senior Sergeant should be very close to cost-neutral. In addition, it would motivate all Senior Sergeants to aspire past their current rank.
- b) The training should be applied across all Senior Sergeants whether their aspirations are promotion to Officer or Station Commander.
- c) The training to be dovetailed and work as a pre-cursor to Officer Training but with an emphasis on personnel management.
- d) The wide application of personnel training will have an overall benefit on staff performance throughout the organisation.

Officer rotations

Forming part of the rank structure considerations, Officer rotations are a misconceived management strategy that does not meet logical objectives other than to create a process where managers do not get to either achieve efficiencies or improve outputs from subordinates.

The concept was derived some time ago, so officers were beholding to the Chief Commissioner and executives as an ill-considered form of discipline but vesting power with Executives for power's sake. The centralising of decision-making has not served the Force well causing a ballooning in the executive ranks and a weakening of the overall decision-making process leading to poor outcomes. In the process, stymying any independent input from subordinates. It was an exercise in control that reflected very poorly on the then Chief Commissioner, exposing the Commissioner's paranoia to criticism.

Following Commissioners did not fare much better, allowing the system to continue. Our advice is that the Rotation system is now supposedly more compassionate to those who are rotated; it is, however, so compromised by nepotism to make the process unconscionable.

The welfare of the Officers and their families has not been given due consideration. The impact of an Officer with a family so severely disrupted by their workplace being moved to anywhere within the State, and that can happen with relatively little notice, is a cruel and unconscionable staff management practice.

The impact on family and relationships between partners can be beyond tolerable. However, some members are affected more than others, indicating nepotism in this practice.

Rotations have ensured that many competent Senior Sergeants have decided not to be promoted. Understandable when halfway through a 30-40 year career, they can be bounced from pillar to post, losing any stability in their workplace and family life. A process that appears in the absence of any available empirical data, a whim of Senior Management.

Part 6

POLICE UNIFORM

- Why review
- Police hats
- Uniform pride
- Queens reign

The presentation of a Police Force is as crucial as its function and forms a critical part of the Service delivery and in the case of the members their safety. Not only are the optics important, but there are safety issues for the community and police alike, and fashion is not one of them.

An essential component of policing is maintaining a harmonious community. It is the authority to perform that essential task that the community licenses the police to perform. That licence is a gift, not a rite as some would believe.

For that authority to be effective, it is not only the acts but also appearance.

To be the part, act the part, look the part.

The move to the black (Salute Blue) Uniform, justified at the time by the then Chief Commissioner, to give the Force a tougher profile. But unfortunately, the public saw it at the time as some sort of practical joke.

Return to light blue shirts and tunics for all ranks as a symbolic move from the decade-long reactive, risk-averse policing approach.

A uniform change to come into line with other States would be as symbolic as much as a practical move to show a change in Police attitude after the damage of the COVID issues.

If sectors of the Police executive believe that the negative community response to the police actions during COVID is not justified or the community has moved on, they need to take their head out of the sand.

It is not a group of vocal anti-vaxxers that are the problem; many citizens who were vaxed deplore the Police approach.

The major failing of the current uniform is the issue of identity.

Some examples,

- a) Approaching an intersection where people are manually controlling traffic or an accident scene, it is impossible to distinguish between tradies and Police, all wearing High vis vests, and it is not until very much closer that police can be identified. Again, a legacy not only of the uniform but the failure of members to wear a hat, a symbol of their high office.
- b) Very recently, a member gave a news interview wearing a jacket. It was not until well into the interview that the member, sporting a full and scraggly beard of a length exceeding the beard rules, that he turned slightly, exposing a police arm insignia patch.

He had no rank insignia, no nameplate, and the word police did not appear to be anywhere. To add to his anonymity, he, of course, was not wearing a hat. So, it really could have been anybody giving the authoritative interview on a police incident.

Police hats

The culture of no hats has become so entrenched that it is an oddity to see members in the field wearing any sort of headdress, and this has a lot to do with the leadership of VicPol, who routinely appear outside and at police operations without a hat, an example set and where any adjustments need to start.

- i. The safety of the members is compromised by the current approach to the uniform or non-uniform as it is often referred to.
- ii. Police blend seamlessly into many operational environments because of the proliferation of High-viz vests worn by a plethora of individuals and the black shirts. This is not in the members' best interest or ability to perform the police function. It is, however, an Occupational Health and Safety issue management cannot ignore.
- iii. Anybody who has been in the vicinity of a Police Station about lunchtime will be amazed at the number of police resources disgorging to be fed. The non-uniform is the common denominator, and amongst the throng, a few members who could walk into bit parts on a Special Forces film set, mooching along in mufti with a fully loaded equipment belt, should not be acceptable in any circumstances.
If a member in mufti is wearing a utility belt and vest, why the mufti? It sort of defeats the purpose; if anonymity is the purpose, it hasn't worked. Or are we the only ones to work out they are the police?
We do not live in an armed society where the carrying of firearms is the acceptable norm. If VicPol has the need to be armed, be in uniform or have weapons concealed, not flaunted.
- iv. Most importantly and directly impacting members' safety, the non-wearing of distinctive headdresses (Black hats don't work) in crowded environments makes police difficult to see and causes a loss of their authority and impact by their presence. Not to mention keeping track of each other in a crowded place like a licensed premise where lighting may not be particularly effective.

The adage often given to us has been that members *break their necks* to get into the Uniform, and as soon as they leave the Academy, they cannot wait to get out of it.

Uniform pride

Part of the demise of the current uniform is the members' lack of pride and personal care.

Many would not know what a tin of nugget was or how to use it, so we assume the only way to have members display any sort of pride in their

appearance is to issue new shoes weekly or provide a dirty shoe exchange.

The same applies to unkempt uniforms appearing to have come straight from the washing machine to work.

It is really a sad state of affairs, and we wonder why discipline has predominantly vanished, and the culture of self over the organisation has evolved.

Uniforms should be a matter of pride. That is why it is called a uniform.

Uniform review

A pragmatic review of the uniforms should be prioritised before summer. We note that hat-wearing and other Uniform arrangements are really not suitable for either the height of summer or the depths of winter.

In this litigious employment environment, the vulnerability to litigation for not providing suitable uniforms is inevitable. In addition, the insurance premiums will further escalate as the risk of health issues, including cancers, manifest. Therefore, it will inevitably require clear instructions to members on how and when they must wear the uniform and protective clothing, whether that be ballistic or environmental protection.

The current presentation of Victoria Police, other than for ceremonial occasions, is the poorest in the country and rates poorly on the international stage. VicPol is shamed by the professional presentation of the other Forces and many private security personnel.

The end of the Queens reign

We also wonder whether arrangements are in place for the demise of the Queen. For example, the Victoria police badge has the Queen Elizabeth Crown, and the Crown of the new king is likely to be the King George Crown, known as the King Charles Crown.

This has nothing to do with Monarchists versus Republicans but is a matter of protocol.

It was very embarrassing to Victoria Police when it was pointed out that the police badge that members swore allegiance under, featured the wrong Crown when the monarch had been incumbent for twenty years.

If we end up a Republic, that will create another set of challenges that have probably not been thought through.

Part 7

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

- Centralising Power
- Matrix Management
- Centralisation v decentralisation
- Decision making
- Public accountability
- Functional audit process

Centralising Power

Management mechanisms introduced in the early 2000s had a negative impact on the Force management processes and have had a dramatic and deleterious effect on the function of the Police Force.

Matrix Management

This inept initiative fed into the centralising of power and was the adoption of the American Matrix Management model. Unfortunately, VicPol was saddled with somebody's modified version bearing little resemblance to the actual concept.

Top-level managers in many of today's leading corporations are losing control of their companies. The problem is not that they have misjudged the demands created by an increasingly complex environment and an accelerating rate of environmental change, nor even that they have failed to develop strategies appropriate to the new challenges. The problem is that their companies are organizationally incapable of carrying out the sophisticated strategies they have developed. Over the past 20 years, strategic thinking has far outdistanced organisational capabilities. – Harvard Business Review

The VicPol interpretation was the 'committee fixation'. Management of VicPol was handed to committees for all manner of decisions that managers should have been able to resolve. The problems caused were-

- Nobody took responsibility or accountability for the decision – *'it was the committee, not me'*.
- Senior executives could have influence in all facets of decision making

- It was extremely inefficient.
- It dramatically increased the centralisation of decision-making.

Although there is some evidence that this process has diminished, the residual effect is that power is still centralised, bloating the size of the Executive with many decisions still being passed up the chain of command by managers who are too quick to abrogate their responsibilities.

The best demonstration of the demonstrable failure of the committee system manifested in the Gobo affair, where the Executive directly involved themselves in the committee process instead of performing their more global responsibilities, managing the Governance of the organisation a primary role. It is arguable that some of the interventions and omissions may be criminal.

Centralisation v decentralisation

Observing VicPol over the recent years, there was a seismic push towards the centralisation of power in the 2000s. Whether that was a misguided adaptation of flawed populist business models or a lack of confidence by the leadership, the latter is our pick.

This has brought up the chain of command, arguably trivial decision-making that accountable officers and in some cases, sub-officers well down the line should have been able to resolve if the policy structure of the organisation was sound.

The wisdom of delegation and decision-making is that the decision should be made as close as is possible to where the effect is felt. Good policy frameworks will ensure the decisions are made in the best interest of the organisation.

Setting a broad policy is the purview of the Executive; implementation is well down the line.

To ensure the system works, each decision-maker must be accountable and that is done with clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).

We have noticed in recent times a tendency to move towards a more decentralised model and that is a good thing; however, there are so many managers in the system who have not had the experience of working in a decentralised environment that resolute action may be needed to achieve the move.

Many managers are just not confident enough to make a decision. The legacy of years of centralised management and will need to be coerced to the decentralised model.

Having achieved decentralisation VicPol, the Executive will become more cohesive and functional, enabling them to concentrate on the global issues facing the Force. This issue has not been well canvassed within the organisation.

Decision making

External observations and advice from both serving and veterans indicate an organisation seriously impacted by "*risk aversion*." This impacts service delivery, responsibilities and accountabilities, manifesting in delays, inactions, frustration, lack of effective communication, absolved of responsibility and a proliferation of extended reviews and committees. Appreciating the increasing tendency towards a litigious society, good practice supports decision-making at the lowest practical level.

The decision-making framework must be aligned with a strong leadership profile, accountabilities and KPIs for all positions of responsibility.

Public accountability

It seems that under the guise of Service Delivery, Service Efficiency within the organisation has made the organisation far less accessible and accountable to the public. That would have to be the antithesis of good policing.

The behaviour of the public and compliance with the rules is greatly influenced by the possibility they may be held to account.

That same principle applies to the Police.

If Police are subject to accountability, it will have a positive impact on unprofessional behaviours.

The principle of disciplinary sanctions acts as a deterrent to egregious behaviours by police and should be reserved for that purpose. The less serious breaches must be resolved at a local command level with Officers given broader licence (and training) to deal with these issues and the option in many cases to refer the matter further removed.

The focus should be on adjusting members' performance and attitudes rather than sanctions.

There will always be a need to escalate some matters as subordinates fail to respond adequately. However, the number of referrals from a particular Officer's span of control must form part of the Officer's KPIs, as an excessive number would indicate a weakness with that particular Officer.

Functional audit process

Many functions within VicPol are done because that is how it has always been done, and other functions have been introduced on the whim of a Chief Commissioner, not on empirical evidence.

The Chief's whim is often the most detrimental as nobody of any authority will ever challenge the Chief risking their career, so bad practices can quickly become entrenched.

As far as we can establish, VicPol does not have an internal or external Audit process for the organisation's functions.

Therefore, it requires an independent mechanism to oversee the evaluation of the organisation's functions and provide recommendations to the Chief Commissioner to ensure the organisation remains effective and fit for purpose.

An Independent Inspectorate needs to be established within VicPol to undertake performance Audits on a range of Police functions to ensure that the organisation's functions with the many vested interests in the ranks of Management remain focused on the Policing role.

An Inspectorate must be attached and report to the Chief Commissioner's Office to be effective and have the authority to perform its function correctly.

The size and complexity of the Command structure of VicPol can dilute the authority of the Chief Commissioner as he must delegate many decision-making functions. However, establishing an organisational watchdog will move authority back to the Chief without impacting delegations.

An argument that the Executive performs this audit process is entirely flawed. You cannot objectively audit yourself. But unfortunately, that currently appears to be happening, making the task of the Chief Commissioner to bring about change much more difficult.

Part 8

RESOURCING

- Rostering
- Considerations
- Police auxiliary
- Considerations

Rostering

The ubiquitous Police Roster that rules the lives of police members has not seen meaningful change for sixty years and probably predates that period.

The current '*roster killer*' is flexible working hours dictated by staff, further aggravated by Part-time members and members weaponizing sick leave.

The standard eight-hour rotating Roster is forever being changed to accommodate the operational and personnel needs of members. There must be a better way, both operationally and for the member's benefit.

Current arrangements are the predominant cause for the organisation not performing the level of 'Service Delivery' the community expects and would argue they pay for. The approximate one thousand five hundred members are off on Workcover for psychological issues, and the numbers accumulatively that are regularly sick, require flexible work hours, task force duties or are part-time, puts the roster strain over one-third of the operational workforce unavailable at any given time.

Some stations have ten or more police who want flexible working hours, and they must be accommodated. This process, apart from causing stations to close for certain shifts coupled with the two-up policy for patrols, means that stations are unable to respond to community demands.

The remaining members must fill the less desirable shifts impacting their lives and leading to more stress-related WorkCover claims.

The old adage of doing the same thing tomorrow and expecting a different result applies.

A vicious growing circular problem that has gained its own inertia to grow. There will be no end to this, just an escalating decline in Service

delivery and the ruination of many a good police member who succumb to the ever-increasing pressure.

An inflexible part-time workforce will be left incapable of maintaining any semblance of Law and Order.

Considerations

VicPol needs to quarantine frontline positions from part-time and flexible working hours imposts. Achieved by an amendment to the Police Act.

The force, however, would be required to identify those non- frontline positions that these staffing arrangements can be accommodated, and the members can apply for these positions in the normal course of their employment.

Police auxiliary

Used successfully throughout many police forces worldwide and two in Australia, the concept of a police auxiliary must be seriously considered.

The model for Victoria may differ to suit particular needs; however, the concept must be explored objectively.

The concept has the following capabilities

- a) Sworn auxiliary members fill the resource gap between unsworn and sworn personnel functions.
- b) Frees up operational members for frontline tasks.
- c) Alleviate members from answering phones with the public while still accessing an experienced police member, improving Service delivery.
- d) Provides mature role model guidance for younger members.
- e) Provides untapped skills to benefit managers.
- f) In a disaster, their skills can be applied to a number of backroom functions
- g) Improves the response and push capacity of VicPol.
- h) Years of policing experience are retained to be passed to the new generation of less experienced.
- i) It seems illogical to pursue the PSO concept (which we support) to relieve members of lesser duties at the inexperienced end but fail to use retired members at the other end where their wealth of experience and maturity would be so beneficial.

- j) The retired members also have broad life experiences that can prove invaluable in mentoring less experienced members.
- k) Their use in Training would be of substantial benefit, creating a positive influence on recruits. The role model concept.

It seems that VicPol has a perception that all retirees who leave the organisation honourably are carrying a chip on their shoulders towards the organisation. For some who have left in less than ideal or honourable circumstances, that is true, but that is not the vast majority, as demonstrated by the CAA and police welfare, where ex-members who are dedicated to policing make a substantial commitment.

It seems illogical not to exploit the large numbers of former competent police who would be happy to work again on flexible arrangements to assist VicPol.

It is often argued that most are out of touch, and when it comes to the current practices and technology, that is very true. However, they did not have their police knowledge extracted when they retired, and there is always some current member available to assist them in the areas they are deficient. They will very quickly pick up the nuances of current practices.

Considerations

- a) a number of vacancies are created across the Operational and Training areas to take advantage of the skills of a Police Auxiliary.
- b) The recruiting of Auxiliary Police is the discretion of the Chief Commissioner.
- c) That Police Auxiliary members be slotted in between the ranks of Leading Senior Constable and Sergeant as a matter of respect and allow them to perform their welfare role with confidence.

Part 9

MENTAL HEALTH PROTOCOLS

The problem with the Police performing any function in the area of mental health is forcing them to perform tasks Police are not trained or competent in and are the responsibility of clinicians.

This is one of a number of tasks where police resources are redirected from their primary function to perform tasks the responsibility of others, which must be addressed.

This practice in an emergency is acceptable but is unacceptable when it becomes routine or a matter of convenience for clinicians.

It is not the responsibility or function of Victoria Police to provide services with the responsibility of other Government instruments which are unable or unwilling to perform their duties and functions.

These instruments can undertake their own rationalisation to provide the Service to their clients in this case, undergoing serious events and not expect the Police to fill the gap.

It is absolute nonsense to expect the Police to deal with a person that is having a Mental episode as it is at this time of greatest risk to the patient and the public that the expert intervention by a Clinician is imperative.

It is not an Ambulance Service problem either. That Service is designed and equipped to deal with the health issue of the body, not the mind.

This issue is not new and has been around for a long time but ironically, the issue was resolved some time ago.

The solution came about by an enlightened Head of Psychiatry at a Major Metropolitan Hospital and the Local Police Command.

He correctly identified that the Crisis Assessment and Treatment teams (CAT) had moved from their original purpose and were now fully engaged in treatment.

The original intent for the CAT function was field-based, where a clinician could intervene when patients were having an issue.

The Psychiatrist reasoned that field intervention could reduce hospital bed demands, and the Clinicians could perhaps resolve some problems on-site. Additionally, the Clinician, in many cases, could assess the environment the patient was in when the episode occurred, further assisting treatment.

Another major issue was that police could sometimes aggravate the episode (no fault of the police) of a patient just by their presence.

That CAT teams could not transport patients should be looked at subsequent to the trial.

The families of patients, who were generally highly stressed out of concern for their family member, found the transporting somebody that is sick in a Divisional Van abhorrent.

The problem identified by the Head of Psychiatry was CAT teams were only assessing and treating patients that attended their facility. Each CAT member had a diary full of appointments and operated in a similar way to many other Health Professionals, by appointment.

The Psychiatrist made internal arrangements to ensure that CAT teams were on call and could respond to any incidents, alleviating many of the problems faced then and now.

The work of the CAT teams was so respected that members regularly called upon them to resolve highly volatile situations or manage Patients who resisted compliance.

Where patients were required to be hospitalised, the Clinicians made those arrangements from the scene, removing elements of danger in the field and avoiding the threat posed to Hospital Casualty as the patients were transferred from the scene straight to the Psychiatric Wing of the Hospital.

The sight of a person with a mental health condition being mistreated by Police in Preston some time ago was most disturbing, and the behaviour of the Police left a lot to be desired. However, the real cause of this problem was that the Police were put in that position by a Clinician who found it more convenient to send the Police rather than the CAT team to undertake a welfare check of the patient.

The first step in dealing with his issue is for VicPol to push back on Welfare checks for Psych patients advising the Health Department Psych services that the Police will no longer perform this non-Police task in the best interest of Psych patients.

This will inevitably bring the Psych Services to the negotiating table with VicPol to resolve this matter once and for all.

Part 10

TRAINING

- Overview
- Training economic impacts
- Failure in training supervision
- Student assessments

An essential function within Policing and as important for the stepped process of a Police Career as it is for maintaining high-level policing competency for police at all levels.

There has been a sustained process of moving training out of the classroom, relying on technology. Unfortunately, this process has gone too far and is now counterproductive.

Arguably one of the unintended consequences is to feed laziness into members.

This online training has been promoted and implemented under the guise of efficiency and a smattering of leaders wanting to be perceived as modernisers.

This training approach has created several unintended consequences, failing in its objectives.

Training economic impacts

The most significant issue is one of economics. A proper pragmatic evaluation of all factors we suggest will likely show that online training is not cost-effective.

The saving in time and the efficiency; created by the ability for online training has moved the time resource drain from the training facilities to the workplace but has lost many efficiencies and benefits in the process.

The importance of face-to-face learning cannot be underestimated where members can properly be assessed compared to their peers and draw comparisons on their own competitive performance.

The opportunity for students to be exposed to other members, not just those in their workplace bubble, provides a more homogenous organisation. Re Building '*Esprit de corps*'.

Working through training in isolation on a computer removes these important benefits.

Failure in training supervision.

The ability of students to shortcut and devalue the training can be rife without Supervision.

One example brought to our notice was a practice where a student is confronted with multiple choice answers they don't know; they guess. If the guess was wrong, the program shuts them out, but they could re-enter and start from the beginning again and go through the module until confronted with the same problem enabling another guess. Wasting another hour or more of productivity.

Getting it wrong does not always motivate students to research but applies additional time to the module. If that impact is multiplied across VicPol, no wonder members spend most of their time in front of a computer screen for the training of questionable value instead of performing their Policing task.

Student assessments

Assessment of students can be added to the mix for suitability for promotion and assisting promotion boards. However, we hasten to add that it does not automatically follow that the highest achievers in training are the best in the field.

With the extent of online training now available to members, the cost-benefit has been lost in the smoke of the system and value return on inputs questionable.

Part 11

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

- Risk of terrorism
- Considerations

- Family /Domestic violence
- Road trauma.
- Crime against businesses

There is no argument that the two-up patrol policy introduced in 2015-16 was a reaction to the real threat of terrorism at that time.

But like many Police initiatives, implementing and managing change is usually poles apart.

Risk of terrorism

The terrorist threat has rarely manifested in Victoria, and we do not suggest that it may never occur but faced with the realities police are dealing with at this time, the terrorist threat policy needs to be reviewed.

If the threat manifests again, reversing this and other policies can be as quickly implemented as they were originally.

We do not advocate removing two-up patrols in every circumstance, but the necessity for two-up vehicles undertaking supervision or administrative tasks is overkill.

Equally, police working in tandem with a vehicle each is a cost-effective way to improve the police function. The additional vehicles are cheaper than hiring and training more members and improve the visible Police presence dramatically.

An incident where one vehicle may attend would attract two increasing the visual impact of the Police response. Supervisors would need to be on top of the vehicles under their control, but it would be a net policing positive.

Technology showing the location of each vehicle to the other reduces danger. In addition, supervisors can use that same technology to improve operational efficiencies.

Considerations

We recommend the policy be referred to each Unit or Station to implement in their operational sphere. In some areas and many duties, it is safe to operate solo, but in others, not so. A decision at the local level will deal with the variables.

Certain classes of duty, force-wide, can be subject to a risk assessment and advice provided to unit managers for the final arbitration. We doubt Senior Officers comply with the policy when driving Police cars to and from work, and we do not propose they should. However, this is an inconsistency that needs resolution.

It is vague as to whether this policy has saved any members.

Family /Domestic violence

External observations and advice from both serving and veterans indicate an organisation seriously impacted by "*risk aversion*." This impacts on service delivery, responsibilities and accountabilities, manifesting in delays, inactions, frustration, lack of effective communication, absolving of responsibility and a proliferation of extended reviews and committees. Appreciating the increasing tendency towards a litigious society, good practice supports decision-making at the lowest practical level.

The decision-making framework must be aligned with a strong leadership profile, accountabilities and KPI's for all positions of responsibility.

The current processes are not helping to reduce this issue, and other policing responsibilities are being regularly overlooked, causing a serious impact on service delivery.

A pragmatic review of the police function in the management of these family issues will identify functions that have, for convenience of others, been foisted on police. This must be reversed, and in particular, the Social Service role that police are expected to perform as well as gathering statistics for other than Police purposes, must end.

Road trauma.

Australia is a signatory to the United Nations Decade of Action 2021-2030 to reduce road trauma by 50% by 2030 and Vision Zero 2050. Victoria's current increasing trend of road trauma can be strategically addressed immediately by:

- Increasing visible police presence (Multiplying effectiveness, accountability, and impact)
- Increasing the police leadership role within government agencies, media and the community
- Community engagement (formally reinstating Community Road Safety Councils).
- Raising the profile of crash investigations to drive the reform agenda. The current glaring omission for every fatal crash, "*How can the risk of a crash of this nature be prevented in the future?*" Missing from both the investigation and any review process. I.e. Action based reform
- Enhancing the integrity of fixed site, point-to-point and mobile electronic enforcement (locations, delays in notifications, fines, resolutions, demerit alignment)

Stolen Cars: Police/the owner with the capability to disable a stolen car by electronic/brake/fuel restriction (current technology). Raised by CAA as "G-Tag" in 2016 – no outcome from VicPol

Crime against businesses

There appears to be a complete misunderstanding among members about when they can refuse to take a criminal report.

There have been instances reported to CAA members where members refuse to investigate a crime advising complainants to take civil action. As soon as it seems there is a business component that is the out for members claiming it is a civil matter.

It is perplexing how these members can determine that the matter is civil without some investigation.

We accept that where a property dispute and the elements of a crime do not exist, it is a civil matter. However, when the elements of a crime do exist, it is irrelevant who the victim is; crime reports and an investigation must occur.

We suggest that very many crimes, particularly deceptions and theft, go not investigated, and perpetrators move to other targets. Most recidivist offenders are well aware of the non-prosecutions and exploit this policing anomaly.

We suspect that members have exploited the legal anomalies of the late 90s, where employers who sacked a worker for theft were regularly taken

to FairWork, where unfair dismissal cases were almost always found in favour of the sacked worker on the basis that the alleged theft had no bearing on the employment arrangements and workers could not be sacked for stealing from an employer or anybody else.

That anomaly has been resolved; however, the significant change in police policy at that time is still relevant today.

If the policy exists, it is being ignored, or a new approach is required.

Part 12

POLICE LAZINESS

- Overview
- Considerations
- Police Generalist or Police Specialist
- Considerations

This issue can only be dealt with head-on and is the elephant in the room nobody wants to acknowledge, let alone address.

To our very great disappointment, there are very many members of Victoria Police who can only be described as lazy.

- Lazy to answer the phone
- Lazy to talk to complainants
- Lazy to get out of their car
- Lazy to turn up for work on time
- Lazy to even look professional
- Slovenly in appearance
- Slovenly in demeanour

We have had feedback that you would wonder why some of these members don't just stay home and have their little workload delivered to them. It would save the sullying their presence brings to the workplace.

Laziness can be more contagious than COVID and spread through a workplace where the conscientious finally give up watching the lazy enjoying all the benefits without hard work and capitulate.

What irritates the CAA is that the lazy receive the same remuneration and allowances as the dedicated, energetic members holding up the organisation.

Astoundingly, laziness does not bar people from promotion, and managers see the minimalistic approach of many as a positive because they cause them less stress. Moreover, they don't do much, so they don't create many problems.

That leads to the lazy being promoted to pursue their laziness and infect subordinates with the same malaise to work.

Being fobbed off by uninterested members is the most common issue raised with the CAA, followed closely by the inability to use the telephone system to communicate and then finding police disinterest, aggravates the lack of Service Delivery.

Having no way to complain adds to the negativity created by lazy members.

'A work ethic is a learnt, not an endemic skill.'

Considerations

The CAA recommends consideration be given to the issue of laziness, bringing it to the fore and alerting members that it will not be tolerated.

Including a Work Ethic Rating on assessments will help.

The Executive could explore other options to address the problem as it will bolster the enthusiasm of the dedicated members by laziness being recognised, targeted and derided.

Police Generalist or Police Specialist

Notably, the downgrading of the Police Generalist as the move to police specialist enters many facets of policing is, unfortunately, a major contributor to laziness. Members do not look to solve the problems they encounter but look to who is the specialist so they can palm the matter off.

The other offshoot of this approach is the much-valued generalist will tend to disappear from the frontline leaving junior members with less experience carrying the bulk of the frontline work.

The explosion of specialists will translate into skill shortages as these members seek promotion, and unless they stay within their specialist field, their ability to manage police operations will be challenging. Specialists,

therefore, tend not to seek promotion if their job is comfortable and provides job satisfaction. This adversely affects the ability of the organisation to have highly trained police filling management and supervisory roles.

We have seen the negative impact of senior managers without adequate Police experience; it is dangerous for Police and the community.

One of the roadblocks will be push back by lazy executives who fear the privileges they have taken they might lose and having to work is anathema.

Exposing and management focusing on the issue and calling it out is not altogether bad.

Considerations

Create specific part-time positions where members can apply for a vacancy when it occurs.

Part-time policing can only be undertaken by members filling specific positions which are not time-critical to Service Delivery.

Granting applications to move to part-time status on a case-by-case basis has an undesirable effect on unit or station commanders faced with a part-timer in a position that they have relied upon as a full-time member to maintain time-critical service to the community.

Appeasing the welfare of a few to adversely impact the welfare of many is illogical.

Part-time positions and flexible hours imposts must be removed from Operational Police Stations so that the impact of accommodating a member for half a shift is removed.

This can not be done by trying to identify roles that these members can perform at a Station. It has to be, an all-in arrangement and positions where the arrangements can be accommodated flagged.

Many members seeking these arrangements may change their minds if they have to move from their current position.

This will reduce impacts on Stations remaining open and patrols on the road.

We are not arguing to stop part-time opportunities but that they are properly managed in the best interest of the Force and all members.

Members who require adjustments to their work-life can be offered the ten-hour part-time shift option if they wish to remain in the operational area.

Having a Divisional Van interrupted mid-shift to swap a part-timer over is ridiculous, as is the inability of part-timers to work night shift, placing that load on other members having to work those shifts more frequently.

When considering cost-benefit, factoring in the additional recruiting to backfill the void, this concept seriously impacts the police budget. Money that could be well spent on more pressing needs.

The shift rotations used in NSW may help reduce the value of part-time work to those seeking a lifestyle change with the benefit that all shifts can be covered equitably.

Part 13

Pre-emptive and proactive policing

- Overview
- The flaw in Task Force Policing
- Police culture
- Merit-based promotion
- Multicultural policing
- Recognising bilingual skills.

At a time when crime, according to statistics, seems to be on the wane, it is the ideal time to ramp up and pursue with vigour the Proactive Policing model, and with some energy, the crime may be kept in check.

An opportunity like this may never present again, and we hope that police managers pause before giving each other high fives because of the reported crime drop. Instead, they need to consider that it was failed police practices in recent years that were causing the rise, and COVID has given them the respite to ensure it does not return.

The strategy of throwing a task force or a specialist group of a myriad of other names at every problem was a failed approach that was corrected by the last major push introducing Proactive Policing by Chief Commissioner S.I. Miller and built upon by Chief Commissioner Kel Glare, who introduced one of the most powerful and effective proactive programs, Police In Schools.

Chief Commissioner Nixon shamefully dismantled many of the proactive functions of the Victoria Police.

To the credit of the current Chief Commissioner, the wisdom of the past has been reintroduced in a new format, and Police are again connecting with our young people in the classroom.

For decades, good practice policing has focused on proactive policing and community policing. The current trend is to use intelligence effectively in a targeted balance between pro-active and pre-emptive policing. While critics claim pre-emptive policing unjustifiably targets recidivists. Unfortunately, the public perspective of Victoria Police Crime Control is that the overall approach is very much reactive.

The new 80 strong Viper task force (July 2022) is a typical example of re-active policing following years of criminality by bikie gangs in Victoria. Likewise, enforcement actions against youth gangs (formally denying their existence), attest to a focus on reactive policing.

Delays from the commission of a crime to publishing video footage of the offender (captured at the time) or delays in *Crime Stopper* publications inhibit investigative processes.

Some practical mechanisms to turn the tide.

- a) Every police officer, as part of their performance appraisal, to demonstrate how they are involved in fulfilling their commitment in their oath of office of doing everything in their power to prevent offences.
- b) In order to be considered suitable for promotion at all levels:
 - i. demonstrate how they are involved in fulfilling their commitment in their oath of office of doing every in their power to prevent offences.
 - ii. Demonstrate how they support members under their command - people-centred leadership.
- c) Establish an Operational Support Command with a specific mandate to assist and support Local Area Commands to develop new, existing and emerging programs

The flaw in Task Force Policing

The major flaw in the Task Force approach is that it is a highly inefficient use of resources. The resources dragged out of Police Operations reduce the capacity of effective policing in the community.

The most recent former Chief Commissioner made an art form of this approach which mirrored his experience in the Federal Policing sphere.

Many CAA members served when the Community Policing was introduced and are only too aware of the naysayers and knuckle draggers within the organisation. They can only see the police function through the prism of reactive, arresting and charging perpetrators as the only way to curb crime.

We understand that charging perpetrators are always going to be a necessity, and some Task Force approach will be required, but they should not be the lead.

The real-world impact on operational policing of a Task Force is

- a) The staff for Task Forces is drawn from the frontline robbing Police Stations of their brightest, most energetic and dedicated staff, a brain drain that adversely affects the Station's capacity to police.
- b) Allegedly temporary duty, they never see the member again.
- c) It can take a very long time for a Task Force secondee to be replaced on Station strength invariable by a newly minted Constable.
- d) Task force secondments add to the drain on Stations along with part-time policing, police working (their) flexible hours, the loss of Police to PTSI and other psychiatric health issues.
- e) Adding to the estimated thirty-plus per cent loss of frontline Police at any given time.

The need for a Task Force is a policing failure to prevent, and the way this failure is approached is to draw more police resources from the front line to address the problem, ironically creating more problems, not less. Go figure the logic?

The more enlightened members have a broader perspective of the Policing function and see the benefits of preventing crime in the first place.

The Chief Commissioner has spoken strongly on this issue, but it would appear that elements within the organisation have not received the memo. As with Miller's introduction, there is a need for resolute direction from the Chief, and if a couple of heads roll to get the message through, then so be it.

Police culture

The culture of an organisation is its beating heart. It is the invisible thread that connects police, particularly in times of adversity.

The Police culture separates the police as somebody special with unique powers and a robust ethical bond with each other police members within the organisation whose primary focus is the safety of the citizenry.

Policing culture is not about what it can do for the police but what the police can do for the community, a concept that many critics of the police culture cannot fathom.

If anybody chooses policing as a career for the rewards, financially or otherwise, then they have chosen the wrong career and will fail.

Police have a unique commonality of purpose that is not easily shaken or adequately understood by those that have not been immersed in the culture.

The police culture is a strong bond that nobody can penetrate, parochial to the Police Force that the member is part of, police from other jurisdictions recruited laterally into the organisation have regularly failed, some dramatically.

Rather than decry this culture, the strengths can be exploited to enhance Policing effectiveness and outputs directly benefiting the community.

Over the years, the challengers to 'break the culture' have been many. They have tried many strategies that have largely failed—usually motivated by jealousy and misunderstanding in equal measure.

The Force must push back as the ruination and dismantling of the culture will make VicPol insipid and ineffective. The community, including those proponents of culture bashing, will pay an unwelcome price.

The first outcome will be apathy, followed fairly quickly by an explosion of corruption.

Ripping out its heart is not smart

Merit-based promotion

The CAA believes that merit-based promotion has dramatically declined in the last decade and has been replaced by blatant nepotism to the detriment of the organisation and would be one of the most significant contributors to dissatisfaction and poor executive performance.

There could be nothing worse for an energetic, effective member than seeing somebody who is lazy but well connected to the Executive promoted over them.

The whole concept of nepotism by the Executive has become quite insidious. They take no direct role but subtly apply pressure on their colleagues that are evaluating prospective applicants for an outcome they favour.

No matter how clever some executives may feel at masking nepotism, the rank and file and the subordinate rank have sophisticated radar to detect nepotism that rarely fails.

This practice has done more damage to the organisation than the practice was ever credited with.

The problem as it permeates the organisation is that members do not respect those who made their career, not on ability, but other influences. As a result, the successful applicant spends their career poorly judged no matter how they might perform; they are always labelled a nepotite.

Multicultural policing

Once upon a time, Victoria Police were leaders in Multicultural Policing, but that mantle seems to have slipped in favour of other special interest groups. Although perhaps marginalised by society in much the same way as new arrivals, their challenges do not relate to their ability to communicate to understand society and its laws. So, their needs are a lot less, yet it seems they are prioritised over new arrivals.

The role of Victoria Police and Multicultural Policing seems fairly sophisticated; however, we are not altogether convinced that the rhetoric matches the frontline outputs.

It seems the Multicultural issue may not be fashionable for *'the chattering classes'*, hence their slip down the priority ladder.

We often hear of new arrivals or their children being over-represented in crime, but VicPol does not seem to be addressing the issue by communicating effectively with these groups.

However, many members are bilingual and bicultural, and the ethnic communities would appreciate having exposure to those members.

Recognising bilingual and bicultural skills.

The skills and evaluation of the bilingual and bicultural skills must be recognised, and an allowance made available to members who are prepared to use their skills and maintain a predetermined level of competency.

Through these many members, a pipeline can be accessed to understand the new arrival's cultural difficulties. Parents of children in contact with the Police are more likely to understand and distract their children from crime. Their children are more likely to behave if they know the connection between the Police and their family.

The problem may be an organisational one where the Force at a corporate level is working hard on the issue, but it dilutes as it goes down the Command line.

Perhaps it is time for the Multicultural philosophies to be driven from the bottom up. Frontline Police given licence to develop strategies to improve relations with new arrivals at a local rather than the corporate level.

Station Commanders given broad KPIs to pursue the issue would be a good start and probably the most effective mechanism as each Station has a different makeup of new arrivals in their community, some do not have any, and many have ethnic enclaves with diverse needs.

The corporate approach tends to be a one size fits all. This is not practical; even with the greatest honourable intentions, it cannot work as well as a local approach.

Part 14

COMMAND AND CONTROL

This is a severe weakness in Victoria Police and needs urgent attention. Many CAA members recount incidents at all levels where the concept of Command and Control has been found wanting or at times clearly absent.

The major display of failure was during the COVID demonstrations, and the lack of Command and Control was so obviously absent to be embarrassing and a performance that has bought severe discredit to the Force, creating bitterness in the community that VicPol may take many years to recover

from. And that is from the general public. Those directly involved will never regain any trust in VicPol.

The commander in charge of the activities where police were involved in running skirmishes should be sacked for complete incompetence.

Watching news reports of these skirmishes, the only difference between the police behaviour and the demonstrators was the police were the ones with the unprofessional uniform and randomly spraying copious quantities of OC Spray at all and sundry.

Questions that many of us pose,

- Why were they chasing the demonstrators?
- What were they going to do when they caught them?
- What was the justification for spraying an old lady they did catch?
- Was the spray the punitive consequence for demonstrating?

Then there were examples where OC Spray was not sufficient with police armed with shotguns firing randomly into the crowd with bean bag rounds. See <https://caainc.org.au/the-non-lethal-bean-bag-myth/>

Just what were the Commanders thinking? That assumes there was one?

The first apparent failure is that there appeared to be no clear objective of what was to be achieved other than confront the demonstrators as some sort of punishment. That is inexcusable.

If senior managers in VicPol do not understand the concepts and practices of Command and Control, what hope is there for the rest of the organisation?

This deficit flows down through the rank structure with failings at times being catastrophic, think Gargasoulous. Not only was there a failure to deal with the issue at hand, but the heightened risk of injury to the public and police members was inexcusable and contributed to the deaths.

These failures were emblazoned across the nightly news for all Victorians to witness and every former police member to lament

Although there are a number of former police with substantial Command and Control skills, if they cannot be secured in short order, the issue is so serious and the need for upskilling so urgent the Military need to be approached to assist in urgently addressing this serious anomaly before we are confronted with other social unrest or heaven forbid, terrorism. Victoria Police should be capable of being called upon to manage disasters, major criminal events, Social Disorder and Terrorism. That capability is currently lacking.

The establishment of Emergency Services Victoria to deal with civil disasters has been a failure. It does not instil confidence that they are better equipped to deal with a disaster than VicPol.

The sidelining of ESV rendered them redundant as the politicians elevated themselves to disaster managers. At some stage we hope a Royal Commission will identify the folly of this approach.

Putting untrained, inexperienced managers who think they know best in charge of a major disaster is always fraught, and it is a wonder more damage was not done, above that avoidable carnage that occurred.

They are just another layer able to be sidelined at the whim of the Government without the protection of the Separation of Powers (which does not function correctly).

Each of these events requires a high-level Command and Control that permeates and is understood through all levels of policing, creating a functional capacity to deal with whatever this State has to deal with in the future.

COVID was one wake-up call; there will be others; of that, there is a guarantee, but VicPol has been warned and has no excuse for not being prepared.

The lack of crowd control equipment was a major shortcoming in these events.

See

A WATER CANNON - SHOULD WE OR SHOULDN'T WE?

<https://caainc.org.au/?s=Water+cannon>

Part 15

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Separation of Powers has become a blurred line.

It is a surprisingly simple concept until it is abused or ignored for political expediency,

*Under the doctrine of the separation of powers, the institution of Government has three separate branches: **the legislature (Parliament) – makes the laws; the Executive – implements the laws; and. the Judiciary – interprets and applies the laws.** 10 July 2018*

When any one of these branches fails to comply with this doctrine, it is arguably a breach of the Constitution, and those who break it are as guilty as those who do not resist the breach.

It will only take an intervention not yet anticipated, and the wall of breaches will tumble.

These breaches are not as one-sided as most would assume, but VicPol has also breached its Constitutional function.

The breaches by Victoria Police relate to the Police's role as part of the Executive arm of the Separation trilogy.

VicPol is responsible for implementing the Laws of Parliament, but on several occasions, VicPol has determined the veracity of the laws of particular prosecutions.

It is irrelevant that VicPol sought external legal advice; it was not their role but the role of the Judiciary that VicPol has usurped, arguably breaching the Constitution.

The Red Shirts saga and Slug-gate are two recent examples.

If the points of proof for a criminal offence exist, then that is where the role of the Police, having submitted the Brief of evidence to the Judiciary, the role of the executive arms ends; the task then falls to the Judiciary to interpret the Law.

There can be no more explicit demonstration of the limit of the Powers under the Constitution for the Executive arm as the Informant in any proceedings heard by superior courts. It is never a member of the Executive arm, but the Crown.

The Constitution has an important role and had VicPol followed its direction, both of the examples provided would probably have long ago been resolved, and it would not be the Chief Commissioner who the public blame, but the Judiciary.

Part 16

G-TAG

- Overview
- Police G-Tag non-action

We are perplexed why this concept was first provided to VicPol by the CAA in 2016, and when no meaningful action occurred, it was published at <https://caainc.org.au/?s=G-Tag> in 2019.

Three years should have been long enough to raise the Titanic, let alone get this project off the ground. But instead, six years of death, agony and countless millions of costs were levied against the community because VicPol did not pick up and drive this concept by removing the ability of criminal and terrorist elements to use their most favoured weapon of choice, a vehicle.

Police G-Tag non-action

We understand that some work, if it can be called that, was done in Dandenong on the use of electronic tracking for cars that were stolen; however, that was in conjunction with the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council, which was going through the last throes of its existence. We assumed that people had woken up to the organisation as a sham. To VicPol's credit, they were, we understand, the first to pull funding, with others following.

How they lasted so long has always been a puzzle. Funded by each State Police Force and the Insurance Industry, their list of achievements was slim, and none of any significance justified the millions of dollars spent to prop it up.

We had contacted the Council when drafting our concept. We received a negative response claiming that the Insurance Industry, as their major individual sponsor, would not be happy with such a drastic approach that might work, as it would adversely affect their businesses. A dramatic reduction in thefts and the inability of criminals to destroy the cars would encourage owners not to insure.

At that time, we concluded that the Council was neither independent nor committed to its lofty ideals, a sham.

We hark back to the Gargasoulous debacle and the deaths and consider that all could have been avoided if the G-Tag had been in place.

The feedback we received of a trial conducted around Dandenong was that it was poorly executed, and the police involved were naive not to pick up the exploited commercial imperatives. They were namely selling insurance to high-end car owners.

It would not take long for the crooks to work out that when they do a home invasion for the keys, they must ensure they secure ALL the phone handsets so they cannot be traced. This was a big turn-off for the pilot participants.

The Pilot increased the risk to the owners and their families, whereas the G-Tag reduced it.

The Pilot was sure to fail as it did and justified by some in VicPol not to pursue the G-Tag. Still, the Pilot never evaluated the G-Tag, so how that conclusion can be reasonably drawn is astounding and shows the complete ineptness of the project management.

In some ways, this was a good outcome because it ensured the incompetents never got their hands on the project when a serious attempt was made to examine it. Their ineptitude would have guaranteed another failure.

Part 17

Drugs

- Drugs a new paradigm
- Drugs, challenging orthodoxy
- Different Thinking – Drugs

Drugs a new paradigm

Watching this State grappling with a drug problem that continues to wreak havoc, ruining our young people, amongst them some of the brightest and best and the majority of the balance dearly loved by their families.

One could argue that while COVID is the most dangerous disease to the old and frail, however, the Drug Epidemic targets the young with more devastating effects.

As a society, we seemed to throw a bottomless pit of money and resources to fight COVID; we were even capable of rushing through enabling Legislation with apparent ease but trying to get some paltry amount to battle drugs is somehow not palatable to develop new strategies.

The question we pose is, are the lives of the young of lesser value than the aged? In our view, a life is a life, and they are all of equal value.

Drugs, challenging orthodoxy

The CAA produced a concept that challenged orthodoxy but has every chance of succeeding where all current efforts have had little to no impact.

The problem is not the concept but that it is not sponsored by the 'right' people or organisations. The CAA is not in fashion.

Working against closed minds is always fraught with difficulty; however, the more people we can encourage to look at the initiative with an open mind, the more likely we will succeed.

Different Thinking – Drugs

see <https://caainc.org.au/different-thinking-drugs/>

This strategy should be appealing to VicPol as it provides a partial solution to the commitment of resources to dealing with the drug issue enabling the police to concentrate on high-end drug crime.

Government should be enthusiastically trialling the proposal as we have seen first-hand the benefits and the acceptance under appropriate circumstances that the community has towards the concept of quarantine, the centrepiece of this proposal.

Clinicians would immediately recognise the merit of the proposal. The ability to access users before they are addicted physically rather than just socially would provide the opportunity for many and better outcomes for the young.

The negativity comes from socially connected who occasionally use drugs themselves or have a vested interest in the continuance and growth of the drug trade. Many wear suits.

Part 18

Royal commissions and reviews

We have watched a plethora of reviews and inquiries touching on the police function over the last decade or so.

What dismays us most is that successive Chief Commissioners have abrogated many of their responsibilities and function—effectively outsourcing their decision-making responsibility.

However, the one common denominator has been the unfettered acceptance of findings that impinge on the Operational function of policing, arguably in contravention of the *Separation of Powers*.

The Commissions and Reviews are part of the Judiciary process and, therefore, must be separate from the Executive of which the Police operations are part.

The strongest outcome from these inquiries should have no more weight than a suggestion. Yet, with some dismay, we have seen sequential Chief Commissioners, seemingly without challenge, accept all findings, many impacting the delivery of police services, the responsibility of the Chief Commissioner.

A classic example is how VicPol responds to domestic violence matters.

The reality of the requirements of the outcome of the Royal Commission in to Domestic Violence has seen the burden of at least four hours applied to every domestic police attend. This locks the police in for a minimum of four hours irrespective of what disaster may befall the rest of the community.

Domestic violence is abhorrent, and police have a responsibility to prosecute perpetrators who commit these crimes and, where possible, prevent them.

The current approach seems to preclude other agencies that have a responsibility leaving the bulk of the task to the police. Much of the responsibility is not a police one but a welfare role. Those services responsible for aspects of welfare need those aspects carved out to be

given to that agency to service. If that means they must provide a twenty-four-hour mobile response capability state-wide, so be it.

People being killed on our roads, random gang violence in the streets, random shootings, and people dealing in death (Drugs) are no less entitled to the police service than those involved in domestic disputes.

VicPol must, for the benefit of all Victorians, have a pragmatic review of the resource commitment and function of police responding to domestic disputes to ensure those tasks, which are either data collection, administrative or non-police functions, are diverted to the responsible agency.

The findings of the Royal Commission, which had no responsibility or need to consider the implications indirectly of the broader delivery of police services to the State. They now have been trialled and tested, so it is time for a review.

With some relief, the latest trick to screw police over received considerable pushback from the Chief.

How the Auditor General could dream that he possessed the competence to examine police use of body-worn cameras is beyond belief.

His findings and comments were utterly at odds with the reality of the proper use of these devices, and it would appear, to the credit of the Chief Commissioner, that the Auditor General seems to have been dismissed as he should have been, along with his findings.

The Auditor-General would be better advised to concentrate on financial reporting that is blatantly evident and subject to IBAC inquiries under his watch. In those areas, he appears not to have taken any action.

Appendix 1

Service Delivery responses

- *'The Task Forces didn't take these lazy persons but only wanted the best. So if you had a replacement for the seconded member, you always got a new Constable. In my time I never saw any of the secondments returned'- Leo*
- *It will be a lack of funding that is causing this situation. Look at the big build, the rail crossing removal, the money spent on cancelling the east west extension. Where do you think the money has gone ?? David*
- *'Task Forces removed members from the road and placed them behind computers, gathering evidence for some months for an arrest of the offender who would eventually get a slap on the wrist. The van used to respond promptly and made the arrest. The victim saw that justice was done, not having to wait months for any action to take place. The offender always knew he was caught at the scene, whereas with a Task Force he is left alone to cause more mayhem, thinking each time that he had got away with it.-Leo*
- *'A question of ethics in allowing a crim to run for months committing crimes with the knowledge of Police must border on complicity by police in those criminal acts. I thought the role was to prevent not facilitate crime.'-Anon*
- *'When we were in the job there were the lazy Senior Constables who infected the new Constables. After we went they became lazy sub-officers who infected their stations / units. Some may have reached Officer rank by now.' - Leo*
- *'Part of the answer is simple. There are around 1500 off on WorkCover for physiologic issues. Vicpol's WorkCover policy is now around 180 million dollars per annum. - Ron*
- *'I recently moved to Morwell and this district has a great police presence but I do recall years ago when you could walk along shopping strips etc and you would see members walking the beat. That sadly is no longer true. What I have noticed is that instead of one car attending a job which was the norm, we now see 3 or for units in attendance. I fail to understand why a simple arrest now requires multiple members when they could be deployed elsewhere. VicPol has the resources; they just have no idea how to utilise the manpower'.-Pat*
- *'All in their little splintered units'.*
- *VicPol mental health strategy is now a complete shame'-Ron*

- *'Our unit was civilianised, to put more members on the road, all 5 of us!'- Allan*
- *'We live on the boundary between Hobsons Bay and Wyndham Councils, (near the intersection of Point Cook and Dunnings Roads) the level of speeding, hoon driving is at plague proportions, but the police presence during the week and weekends is practically non-existent. 'It has been like this for years, despite the very significant growth in population.'* - Kevinl
- *'Bring back the Reservist'-Phil*
- *The Chief Comm is a complete dud and a fish rots from the head as they say. They need to stop pushing more jabs on members . The apathy is palpable. It seems a complete overhaul of Police Command is needed for a new attitude. -Dennis*
- *Police now have pso and civil servants and watchhouse staff in grey uniforms allegedly to free them up ... well so what is the true and actual personnel count. Despite this they have never been poorer at customer service or more disrespected by the public who once backed them. They are in many cases lazy..ride ... disinterested and arbitrary in their policing. Yet they found time and funds to have all the best equipment..crowd control toys etc ...recently taking their toys out to trial them on the citizens they swore to protect. Victpol is politically influenced like never before in its history.
In victoria we have police..Police pso... Police custody officers... civil servants.. fishery officers... park rangers... sheriff's... maritime services officers ... and God knows how many more... we are over regulated unless of course you're a gang member or a criminal!
Whoever prior to any election put this over enforcement under delivering model to us the people? Get rid of this parasites on the public purse swanning around in The best cars and boats with the best gear money can buy...and give us a police force that actually serves us.
This whole State is so far off the rails people have not seen the incidious creeping deterioration.
Wake up Terence*

Appendix 2

Situational awareness examples

A few examples of a lack of Situational Awareness and the danger to members,

- f) Where members on the beat are engrossed in conversation with each other, this is dangerous. The lack of Situational Awareness is indicative of the danger. Where the situation is suitable, they need to separate so the public can engage with them and they can focus on their environment, not each other.
- g) In recent times (pre-COVID), we saw patrols consisting of eight to ten members in the city. They were not patrolling, they had no supervision or leadership, and from a safety perspective, the large number presented a useful target. The members would not have known what hit them as they were all engaged with each other and not in a position to take evasive action should a threat materialise.
- h) One of our group reported watching a Sergeant speaking to members on the steps of Parliament House. The group stood in an inward-focused huddle halfway up the steps with the members' backs to the parapets. Remarkably the Sergeant had his back to the public space from where any threat might come. At least the approach to policing there generally sees three or four members, each taking up different positions so they can focus on their task and engage with people as required.
- i) Police rubber necks are a problem and have been from time immemorial. The supervisor's function for many years has been the only solution to move members on, putting them back on patrol, etc., when they are obviously not required at an incident. So the problem is either a reduction of Supervisors on the road or Supervisors not understanding their function, Supervision.

Appendix 3

OATH OF OFFICE

OATH OR AFFIRMATION FOR POLICE OFFICERS

I [*insert name*] [*swear by Almighty God/do solemnly and sincerely affirm*] that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the Queen as a police officer in Victoria in any capacity in which I may be appointed, promoted, or reduced to, **without favour or affection, malice or ill-will** (that is to act fairly at all times) for the period of [*insert period*] from this date, and until I am legally discharged, **that I will see and cause Her Majesty's peace to be kept and preserved**, and **that I will prevent to the best of my power all offences**, and that while I continue to be a police officer **I will to the best of my skill and knowledge** (a commitment to continuous learning) **discharge all the duties legally imposed on me faithfully and according to law.**

PEELIAN PRINCIPLES

Description

The Peelian principles summarise the ideas that Sir Robert Peel developed to define an ethical police force. The approach expressed in these principles is commonly known as policing by consent in the United Kingdom and other countries such as Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The nine principles are:-

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by pandering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law

6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historical tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it

VICTORIA POLICE ACT

8 Role of Victoria Police

The role of Victoria Police is to serve the Victorian community and uphold the law so as to promote a safe, secure and orderly society.

9 General functions of Victoria Police

(1) The functions of Victoria Police include the following—

- (a) preserving the peace;
- (b) protecting life and property;
- (c) preventing the commission of offences;
- (d) detecting and apprehending offenders;
- (e) helping those in need of assistance.