Choosing the Wrong Remedy ~ Why Certiorari Cannot do the Work of an Appeal

The modern law of judicial review has spent decades insisting on a simple proposition: certiorari and appeal perform different constitutional functions. Yet applications continue to fail because that distinction is overlooked or deliberately blurred by litigants seeking a more favourable pathway to relief. Since Craig v South Australia, the High Court has drawn a firm line between jurisdictional error, which attracts the supervisory jurisdiction of superior courts, and error within jurisdiction, which does not. Certiorari exists to quash decisions affected by the former. Appeals exist, where statute permits, to correct the latter.
That distinction is not semantic. It determines whether a court is acting as a supervisor of legality or as a reviser of outcomes. Certiorari is concerned with power, whether the decision maker stayed within the bounds of authority conferred by law. Appeal is concerned with correctness, whether the decision maker exercised that authority properly.
Certiorari cannot be substituted for appeal, the temptation to invoke certiorari when appeal rights are narrow or unavailable is understandable. Judicial review offers constitutional stature and the promise of decisive relief. But it comes at a price. A court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not ask whether the decision was preferable, reasonable, or even fair. It asks whether the decision-maker misunderstood the limits of its statutory task, asked the wrong legal question, ignored a mandatory condition, denied procedural fairness in a way that went to jurisdiction, or otherwise exceeded authority.
Errors of evaluation, weight, or fact finding even serious ones do not ordinarily meet that threshold. Accordingly, where the substance of the complaint is that the tribunal reached the wrong conclusion on the material before it, certiorari will fail. The court is not permitted to transform judicial review into a merits appeal simply because an appeal pathway is inconvenient or closed. Equally problematic is the tendency to pursue appeal alone when the true complaint is jurisdictional. Appeals generally proceed on the assumption that a legally valid decision exists. They invite correction, not nullification. Where a decision maker has misunderstood the nature of its task or exercised power it did not possess, that assumption is false. In such cases, failure to plead jurisdictional error and to seek certiorari or equivalent constitutional relief risks entrenching an unlawful decision by treating it as merely flawed rather than invalid.
The High Court’s insistence on maintaining the boundary between certiorari and appeal reflects more than procedural discipline. It preserves the allocation of responsibility between courts and administrative decision makers. If certiorari were allowed to operate as a de facto appeal, statutory limits on appeals would be rendered ineffective. Conversely, if appeals were treated as sufficient to absorb jurisdictional error, the supervisory role of superior courts would be diminished.
The distinction protects both parliamentary intention and constitutional structure. The practical question is not whether a decision appears wrong, but why it is said to be wrong. If the complaint goes to authority, statutory construction, or the legal limits of the decision maker’s task, certiorari is engaged. If the complaint goes to assessment, discretion, or factual conclusions reached within power, appeal (if available) is the correct avenue. Where both may arise, they must be pleaded distinctly and with care.
Courts are adept at identifying when one remedy is being used to do the work of the other. When that happens, the result is often not a loss on the merits, but a refusal to entertain the case at all. Certiorari is not an alternative appeal. It is a constitutional safeguard against unlawful exercises of power. Appeals are instruments of correction, confined by statute and purpose. Choosing between them is not a matter of preference, but of principle. And in administrative law, choosing wrongly can be fatal not because the complaint lacks substance, but because it has been brought to the wrong forum, in the wrong form.

32 pages