What is the myth of the Belligerent?
Our readers have again asked us to explain the legal meanings of the terms belligerent and combatant. One of the more misleading themes found throughout the "Papers" and promoted by influencers is the repeated use of the word "belligerent" as though it applies to the entire civilian population of an occupied country. This is not how the law of armed conflict has ever operated.
The Hague Regulations were written to govern the conduct of war between the belligerent parties to an armed conflict, principally States and their armed forces, militias, and other lawful combatants engaged in hostilities. Civilians living within occupied territory were never automatically classified as belligerents simply because they resided under military occupation. On the contrary, the law drew a clear distinction between those who fought and those who did not. The civilian population was afforded protection precisely because it was not regarded as a belligerent force.
This distinction became even more explicit following the adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949, which established comprehensive protections for civilians living under occupation. While an occupying power may exercise limited administrative authority necessary to maintain public order and safety, it does not transform the inhabitants into belligerents, nor does it acquire sovereignty over the territory itself.
The "Papers" and influencers frequently blur these carefully defined legal categories, creating the impression that every resident of an occupied territory somehow becomes part of the conflict as a belligerent. Neither the Hague Regulations nor the Geneva Conventions support such an interpretation. International humanitarian law consistently distinguishes between combatants, occupying authorities, and protected civilians, with each category carrying its own distinct rights and obligations.
What is the myth of the Combatant?
A similar misunderstanding appears in the "Papers" treatment of the term "combatant." Throughout the Hague Regulations and later the Geneva Conventions, a combatant is not simply any person living within a country, nor does the term extend to an entire civilian population by implication. Combatants are those individuals who are legally entitled to participate directly in hostilities, such as members of a State's armed forces or other organised armed groups that satisfy the requirements of international humanitarian law. They possess both rights and obligations under the laws of war, including the right to engage in combat and, if captured, the entitlement to prisoner-of-war status under the applicable conventions.
However, not every member of the armed forces is a combatant. Military medical personnel and chaplains, for example, are members of the armed forces but are classified as non-combatants and are afforded special protections under the law of armed conflict.
Civilians, by contrast, are expressly distinguished from combatants and are protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. This distinction is one of the foundational principles of modern international humanitarian law.
The "Papers" and influencers frequently blur this distinction by implying that legal concepts applicable to combatants somehow extend to the entire population or to ordinary citizens by virtue of nationality alone. This interpretation is not supported by the text of the Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions, or the subsequent jurisprudence of international courts. International humanitarian law consistently separates combatants, civilians, occupying powers, and protected persons into distinct legal categories, each with different rights, duties, and protections. Conflating these categories creates an entirely different legal framework from the one established by the treaties. It encourages readers to believe that provisions governing the conduct of armed forces during war somehow regulate the everyday legal relationship between governments and their civilian populations in peacetime. That is not the purpose of the law of armed conflict, nor is it reflected in the language of the treaties themselves.
When the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions are read in their proper context, they regulate the conduct of States and organised armed forces during international armed conflict. They do not redefine the legal status of an entire civilian population as combatants, nor do they provide a basis for treating ordinary citizens as participants in a perpetual state of war with their own government. The distinction between combatants and civilians is deliberate, longstanding, and fundamental to the operation of international humanitarian law. Ignoring these distinctions fundamentally alters the meaning of the treaties and leads readers to conclusions that the treaties themselves do not express.
Non-Belligerent and Non-Combatant: Understanding the Difference
One of the recurring difficulties encountered when reading the "Papers" is the treatment of legal terminology as though ordinary words and legal terms have identical meanings. International humanitarian law does not work this way. Every term used in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions has a precise legal definition, developed over many decades of treaty negotiation, military practice, and judicial interpretation. When those definitions are expanded beyond their intended meaning, the legal conclusions drawn from them become increasingly detached from the treaties themselves.
The distinction between a "non-belligerent" and a "non-combatant" provides a clear example. Although these expressions may appear similar, they address entirely different legal questions. A non-belligerent traditionally refers to a State that is not a party to an armed conflict. It is a description of a nation's relationship to a war, not the legal status of individual people living within its borders. By contrast, a non-combatant refers to an individual who is not legally entitled to participate directly in hostilities. The term concerns a person's role during armed conflict, not the political or constitutional status of the State in which they reside.
This distinction is fundamental to the operation of the law of armed conflict. During a war between two States, those States are the belligerents. Their armed forces generally constitute the principal combatants, although certain members of the armed forces, such as medical personnel and chaplains, are classified as non-combatants under international humanitarian law. Civilians, humanitarian workers, and others who do not take part directly in the fighting are not combatants and enjoy legal protections precisely because they are not participants in the conflict. The law deliberately separates these categories to ensure that those not engaged in hostilities are protected from the effects of war.
The "Papers" frequently blur these distinctions by suggesting that concepts applicable to belligerent States or combatants somehow extend to the general civilian population. In doing so, they shift legal terminology away from its accepted meaning and create the impression that wartime provisions regulate the ordinary legal relationship between governments and their citizens. This is not supported by the treaties. The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions were drafted to regulate the conduct of States and organised armed forces during armed conflict, not to redefine the constitutional status of civilians living in peaceful societies.
Understanding the distinction between belligerents, combatants, and civilians is therefore essential. A State may be a belligerent while millions of its citizens remain civilians. Likewise, an occupied territory may be administered by an occupying power while its inhabitants continue to retain their protected civilian status under international humanitarian law. Neither the Hague Regulations nor the Geneva Conventions convert an entire civilian population into combatants or belligerents simply because war exists. To suggest otherwise is to overlook one of the central humanitarian principles upon which these treaties were built: the clear legal separation between those who fight and those who do not.
This careful use of legal language is not accidental. It reflects more than a century of development in international humanitarian law, designed to limit the effects of war by distinguishing between the parties to a conflict and the civilians who must be protected from it. Reading these terms in their proper legal context preserves the meaning intended by the treaties. Reading them without that context risks transforming specialised legal definitions into broad assertions that the treaties themselves neither state nor support.